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By January 2015, at least 29 international investment arbitration proceedings were 
commenced against the Czech Republic.
1
 The number of claims in comparison to 
other states is exceptionally large; in fact, it is the third highest number in the world.
2
 
Given that investment arbitration is an extremely costly affair where the state has 
nothing to gain but much to lose, the situation is clearly not desirable. 
It is of paramount importance to define the causes underlying such amount of 
investment cases instituted against the Czech Republic and to try to find a remedy. 
The problem is a very complex one, stretching over several fields of study including 
politics, economics, and of course, law. Just as with any other complex issue, it is the 
best to break it into little parts and analyse these separately one by one. This work 
attempts to examine one piece of the puzzle, the metaphorical root of the problem – 
the bilateral investment agreements (‘BITs’). 
The word ‘root’ was chosen as BITs indeed form the root, the basis, of proceedings 
that the Czech Republic took part in. They both provided the legal basis of the 
proceedings, which is the jurisdiction of the tribunal, and they laid down the 
applicable law. The wordings of Czech Republic’s BITs should therefore be taken 
into account when inquiring after the reasons why the Czech Republic is frequently 
targeted. 
However, even the topic of BITs as a whole is too wide and needs to be further 
specified in order to be manageable within the space intended for this work. A 
scrutiny of the cases the Czech Republic faced in the past reveals that there are 
several problems that connect to the BITs and their wording. Each of the problems 
emerges in different stages of the proceedings.  
                                                 
1
 UNCTAD ‘Recent Developments in Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS)’ (2014) 1 
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When one searches for a place where to start, it is usually the best to start at the 
beginning. At the beginning of each proceedings there is the question of the 
jurisdiction of the tribunal and a little later down the road there is the question of 
admissibility of the claim. Let us therefore examine whether there can be a problem 
with the clauses that pertain to jurisdiction of the tribunal and admissibility of the 
case. A scrutiny of the cases reveals one surprising fact: certain investors decided to 
raise claims under circumstances where it was prima facie very uncertain whether 
any tribunal under similar circumstances could ever have jurisdiction over such 
dispute and whether such claims could be admissible. Yet the investors believed the 
respective law governing the issue would allow them to proceed with the case. 
All of the cases relate to issues on which the public opinion is either divided, or 
which consist of behaviour that is straightforwardly condemned by the community of 
academics and practitioners alike. The first of these issues is treaty shopping, a 
practice where an investor restructures its investment in a way so as to obtain 
protection of a BIT. A particularly clear case of a criticized form of treaty shopping 
occurred in the case of Phoenix v the Czech Republic 
3
 (‘Phoenix’). According to the 
Czech Republic, a similar instance of treaty shopping also occurred in the case of 
Saluka v the Czech Republic
4
 (‘Saluka’).  
The second issue is parallel proceedings, where one ultimate investor commences 
two different arbitral proceedings regarding the same set of measures taken by the 
state. This happened in the cases of Lauder v the Czech Republic
5
 (‘Lauder’) and 
CME v the Czech Republic
 6 
(‘CME’). The third issue asks of the question whether 
the most favoured nation clause could and should be applicable to dispute resolution. 




                                                 
3
 Phoenix Action, Ltd v Czech Republic (Award of 15 April 2009) ICSID Case No ARB/06/5 
(Phoenix Award). 
4
 Saluka Investments BV v Czech Republic (Partial Award of 17 March 2006) (Saluka 
Award). 
5
 Ronald S Lauder v Czech Republic (Final Award of 3 September 2001) (Lauder Award). 
6
 CME Czech Republic BV v Czech Republic (Partial Award of 13 September 2001) (CME 
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7
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These cases have two things in common. Firstly, the argumentation the Czech 
Republic used therein showed that the state perceived the situations as problematic 
and undesirable and attempted to combat them with mechanisms contained in its 
BITs. Its argumentation was successful only in the case of Phoenix. The majority of 
purported breaks in BITs were thus ineffective. Secondly, they represent situations 
where, according to the Czech Republic, an investor should never have even 
contemplated to raise a claim. However, because the investors saw an opportunity in 
a form of a particular wording of a BIT clause, proceedings were instituted. The 
number of the proceedings against the Czech Republic rose. These cases leave one to 
wonder whether other investors could be inspired to raise claims under similar 
circumstances and consequently, whether the Czech Republic will have to face 
perhaps even more controversial arbitrations in the future. 
This brings us to the key questions of this work: could the high number of investment 
cases against the Czech Republic have been partially prompted by ineffective 
provisions in Czech Republic’s BITs? If so, do other of these BITs contain more 
effective mechanisms which could prevent the situations from reoccurring again? If 
not, do any such mechanisms even exist? 
To answer these questions, this work firstly scrutinises the cases in order to pinpoint 
the factors which facilitated the situations and identify respective provisions in the 
BITs that were invoked. It then surveys all other Czech BITs
8
 to see if the same 
clauses are present there as well and if so, how they are worded. Lastly, it analyses 
the provisions, asks whether they could be effective in the situations at hand and if 
the answer is to the negative, it suggests how to change them. 
Regarding the sources, the work operates primarily with arbitral awards issued in the 
above stated cases and BITs concluded by the Czech Republic. It also draws 
inspiration from academic works dedicated to each of the issues. Where relevant, it 
looks into arbitral awards issued in cases raised against other states. 
The work starts with explaining the terms ‘jurisdiction’ and ‘admissibility’, 
elaborates on the role of these aspects in arbitral proceedings and explains how they 
are connected to BITs (Chapter 2). It then proceeds to inspect the respective issued 
                                                 
8
 For enumeration of BITs cited in this work see footnote 277. 
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one by one. The issue of treaty shopping is the topic of Chapter 3. Chapter 4 is 
dedicated to parallel proceedings, and Chapter 5 to the question of the most favoured 
nation clause. Chapter 6 concludes the whole work. 
The work, for the sake of consistency, focuses only on BITs that are currently valid. 
It does not take into consideration multilateral investment treaties or treaties that are 
being negotiated in the present. 
2. JURISDICTION AND ADMISSIBILITY DEFINED AND 
UNDERSTOOD 
Jurisdiction of tribunals and admissibility of claims are two very important aspects of 
every arbitral proceedings. The absence of either of those aspects means that the 
claimant will not be successful in its claim. Whether or not a tribunal will have 
jurisdiction over a claim and whether the claim will be admissible should therefore 
be the first point to contemplate when an investor decides if it should raise a claim. 
Clearly and narrowly constructed requirements for jurisdiction and admissibility can 
deter investors from instituting proceedings. 
For the purpose of this work it is necessary to first define what is understood by both 
terms, explain what the precise role of both elements in proceedings is and assesses 
what the relationship between jurisdiction and admissibility on one side and BITs on 
the other is. Only then can one proceed to examine the respective clauses in BIT and 
examine their utility. 
Jurisdiction can be defined as an adjudicative power of a tribunal,
9
 or in another 
words, the power of a tribunal to hear a case.
10
 The question of tribunal’s jurisdiction 
is the first one to be solved in each proceedings; if the tribunal finds it lacks the 
power to hear the case, it will terminate the proceedings without ever examining its 
                                                 
9
 Zachary Douglas, The International Law of Investment Claims (CUP 2009) (Douglas) 
[291]. 
10
 Waste Management Inc v United Mexican States (Dissenting Opinion of Keith Highet) 
ICSID Case No ARB(AF)/98/258 (Waste Management) [59]. 
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merits. For these reasons, jurisdiction of a tribunal has been labelled as the 
‘cornerstone’ of each proceedings.
11
  
In order to understand why jurisdiction of a tribunal plays such a prominent role in 
arbitral proceedings, one must appreciate the concept of investment arbitration as 
such. International investment arbitration is a very specific institute. It allows an 
individual to raise a claim directly against a sovereign and independent state using a 
platform that has not necessarily been created by national laws of this state, but 
instead may have been created on an international level by an agreement of this state 
and a home state of the individual. As a sovereign member of the international 
community, a state may by no means be coerced to take part in investment arbitration 
proceedings – the proceedings can take place only with the consent of a state. The 
power of a tribunal to hear the case stems from this consent.
12
 
There are three ways in which a state generally gives its consent to arbitration.
13
 
Firstly, it may stem from a direct agreement between the investor and the host state. 
Secondly, it may be founded by a national legislation of the host state. Thirdly, and 
crucially for this work, a consent may be given through an international treaty 
between the host state and the home state of the investor. In practice, this type of 
consent is often vested in BITs.
14
 
The vast majority of BITs contains a clause through which the states consent to 
international investment arbitration;
15
 for the purposes of this work, these clauses 
will be referred to as ‘dispute resolution clauses’. A dispute resolution clause may 
read as follows: 
‘Each Contracting Party hereby consents to submit a dispute [between 
a contracting party and an investor of the other contracting party 
concerning an investment of the latter] to an arbitral tribunal.’
16
 
                                                 
11
 J Lew, L Mistelis, and S Kröll, Comparative International Commercial Arbitration 
(Kluwer Law International 2003) 329. 
12
 Rudolf Dolzer and Christoph Schreuer, Principles of International Investment Law (2nd 
edn, OUP 2012) (Dolzer and Schreuer) 238. 
13
 ibid (n 12) 238. 
14
 ibid (n 12) 242. 
15
 ibid (n 12). 
16
 Netherlands BIT (n 8) art 8(2). 
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Jurisdiction is usually understood as having three aspects: a material one (jurisdiction 
ratione materiae), a personal one (jurisdiction ratione personae), and a temporal one 
(jurisdiction ratione temporis).
17
   
Jurisdiction ratione materiae asks which type of dispute can be submitted to an 
arbitral tribunal. Some BITs, such as the Agreement on Encouragement and 
Reciprocal Protection of Investments between the Czech and Slovak Federal 
Republic and the Kingdom of the Netherlands
18
 (‘Netherlands BIT’) cited above, 
contain a broad definition of the term dispute – it is any dispute between an investor 
and the host state regarding an investment made pursuant to the BIT. Other BITs are 
more restrictive; for example, the Agreement between the Government of the United 
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Government of the Czech 
and Slovak Federal Republic for the Promotion and Protection of Investments
19
 
entitles the tribunal to hear only a claim concerning disputes regarding certain 
provision of the BIT.
20
  
Jurisdiction ratione personae relates to the question of who is entitled to submit a 
claim. BITs typically state that it is an ‘investor’, while this term is being defined 
elsewhere in the BIT. The Netherlands BIT can again serve as an example here; its 




The third aspect of jurisdiction, jurisdiction ratione temporis, examines whether the 
obligation in question was in force at the time of the alleged breach. This aspect is an 
embodiment of a principle referred to as the intertemporal principle.
22
 It was 
eloquently expressed by the Permanent Court of Justice as follows: ‘A juridical fact 
must be appreciated in the light of the law contemporary with it, and not of the law in 
force at the time when a dispute in regard to it arises or falls to be settled.’
23
 An 
investor may therefore complain of allegedly illegal measures taken by the state only 
                                                 
17
 Douglas (n 9) [301]. 
18
 Netherlands BIT (n 8). 
19
 UK BIT (n 8). 
20
 ibid art 8(1). 
21
 Netherlands BIT (n 8) art 8(1), 8(2), 1(b). 
22
 Douglas (n 9) [616]. 
23
 Island of Palmas (1928) 2 RIAA 829, 845.  
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if the measures were forbidden by a BIT at the time when they were taken. The 
principle does not have to be specifically embodied in a BIT in order to apply. 
The aspect of jurisdiction therefore relates to the power of a tribunal to hear the case 
and as such is usually founded in respective provisions of BIT.
24
 Admissibility is 
different. It is examined at the next stage of the proceedings. In order to determine 
whether a case is admissible, the tribunal inquires into the nature and features of the 
claim itself.  
The question of admissibility is the question of whether it is appropriate
25
 for a 
tribunal, which has jurisdiction over the claim,
26
 to uphold such claim. It invites the 
tribunal to examine the circumstances surrounding the claim in order to find out 
whether there exists a fact for which it would be inappropriate for a tribunal to rule in 
favour of an investor even if the merits of the case would strictly speaking lead to 
that conclusion. To put it differently, an objection to admissibility of a claim amounts 




The reasons why a claim may be found inadmissible vary. A claim has been found 
inadmissible e.g. due to the absence of good faith, as pronounced by the tribunal in 
Plama Consortium Limited v Republic of Bulgaria.
28
 In this case the investor 
misrepresented its true identity
29
 in order to obtain a necessary approval from the 
state.
30
 The tribunal found that such conduct was contrary to the principle of good 
faith,
31
 and stated that ‘In consideration of the above […], this Tribunal cannot lend 
                                                 
24
 cf SGS Société Générale de Surveillance v Republic of the Philippines (Decision of the 
tribunal on Objections to Jurisdiction of 29 January 2004) ICSID Case No ARB/02/6 (SGS v 
Philippines) [154]. 
25
 Waste Management (n 10) [59]. 
26
 cf SGS v Philippines (n 24) [155]. 
27
 Gerald Fitzmaurice, The Law and Procedure of the International Court of Justice (Grotius 
Publications Limited 1986) vol 2 438. 
28
 Plama Consortium Limited v Republic of Bulgaria (Award of 27 August 2008) ICSID 
Case No ARB/03/24.  
29
 ibid [129]. 
30





its support to Claimant's request and cannot, therefore, grant the substantive 
protections of the [investment agreement].’
32
  
Another example of inadmissibility can be found in the case of SGS Société Générale 
de Surveillance v Republic of the Philippines.
 33
 In this case, the investor instituted 
international investment arbitration proceedings, while alleging that the host state 
breached a BIT by breaching a contract concluded between the investor and the host 
state.
34
 However, the contract itself also contained a dispute resolution clause.
35
 The 
tribunal decided that the claimant should not be allowed to bring its claim to 
international arbitration; instead, the claim should be heard pursuant to the dispute 
resolution clause present in the contract
36
 and ruled the claim inadmissible.
37
 
The reasons for inadmissibility are often found in general principles of international 
law outside BITs. However, that does not mean that requirements on admissibility 
cannot be included in a BIT. 
As shown above, jurisdiction and admissibility are different concepts. It is important 
that tribunals properly distinguish between these two.
38
 Although it may seem that 
the lack of jurisdiction of a tribunal and inadmissibility of a claim may have the same 
ultimate consequences (i.e. investor will not be successful in its claim), dismissal of a 
claim due to a lack of jurisdiction brings about different ramifications than dismissal 
of a claim due to inadmissibility.  
Most importantly perhaps, the distinction is important for the possibility to challenge 
the arbitral award. An award may usually be challenged on the basis that the tribunal 
erred in its finding jurisdiction over the claim; however, it may not be challenged 
based on tribunal’s mistaken views on the merits.
39
 Mistaking a matter of jurisdiction 
                                                 
32
 ibid [146]. 
33
 SGS v Philippines (n 24). 
34
 ibid [15]–[16]. 
35
 ibid [137].  
36
 ibid [154]. 
37
 ibid [155]. 
38
 Jan Paulsson, ‘Jurisdiction and Admissibility’ in Gerald Aksen (ed), Global Reflections on 
International Law, Commerce and Dispute Resolution: Liber Amicorum in Honour of Robert 
Briner (ICC Publishing 2005) (Paulsson) 601. 
39
 David AR Williams QC, ‘Jurisdiction and Admissibility’ in Peter Muchlinski, Federico 
Ortino, and Christoph Schreuer (eds), The Oxford Handbook of International Investment 
Law (OUP 2008) (Williams) 920. 
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for a matter of admissibility may therefore have the effect of depriving an investor of 
the possibility of challenging the award. 
Theoretically, a correct classification of the reason why the claim cannot be upheld 
could also speed up the proceedings, as the tribunal usually first examines 




It should be noted that the distinction between jurisdiction and admissibility, albeit 
important, is often unclear
41
 and tribunals sometimes struggle with the correct 
classification of these two elements.
42
 Different tribunals may perceive similar issues 
differently; academic works often use the terms in conjunction.
 43
 Consequently, it is 
possible that where tribunals and consequently this work refers to jurisdiction, the 
respective problem should have better been defined as one of admissibility and vice 
versa.  
Jurisdiction and admissibility are both essential aspects of every case. Jurisdiction is 
usually vested in arbitral tribunal by the virtue of a combination of various provisions 
of a BIT. The lack of admissibility on the other hand often depends on circumstances 
not connected to any of BIT’s clauses. This does not mean that certain situations 
under which a claim can be found inadmissible cannot be incorporated in BITs. It is 
therefore the wording of BITs that one should examine if there are concerns that the 
requirements for jurisdiction and admissibility are too lenient and invite too many 
investors to commence investment arbitration proceedings. 
3. TREATY SHOPPING 
The first problem that emerged in cases against the Czech Republic that this work 
discusses is treaty shopping. The term treaty shopping designs a behaviour when 
                                                 
40
 Some tribunals issue an award on ‘jurisdiction and admissibility’, e.g. in SGS v 
Philippines (n 24); Abaclat and Others v Argentine Republic (Decision on Jurisdiction and 
Admissibility of 4 August 2011) ICSID Case No ARB/07/5.  
41
 Williams (n 39) 920. 
42
 Paulsson (n 38) 607. 
43
 cf e.g. Eric De Brabandere, ‘“Good Faith”, “Abuse of Process” and the Initiation of 
Investment Treaty Claims’ [2012] 3 JIDS 609. 
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investors ‘deliberately seek to acquire the benefits of an investment treaty by making 
foreign investments or bringing claims from third countries that have more 
favourable treaty terms with the target host state.’
44
 In another words, it is a situation 
when investors attempt to gain access to protection of their investment that they were 
previously not entitled to. 
The Czech Republic has alleged that an investor engaged in treaty shopping in two 
instances: in Phoenix and Saluka. In the Phoenix case, a company named Phoenix 
Action, Ltd. (‘Phoenix’) acquired an investment, after there were some issues with 
the investment. Phoenix then commenced proceedings against the Czech Republic in 
respect to these issues. In the case of Saluka, the claimant in the dispute, Saluka 
Investment BV (‘Saluka’), was a company that was effectively owned by another 
company that was incorporated in a different country and that was not under the 
protection of any investment treaty. The mother company was not allowed to bring 
the claim on its own, and it used Saluka to do it in its stead. 
In both cases, the Czech Republic objected to the jurisdiction of the tribunal. In 
Phoenix it was successful; in Saluka it was not. The question that presents itself is 
whether in both cases the claimant indeed engaged in undesirable behaviour. If so, 
the next question is why the situation was not prevented, and how a similar situation 
can be averted in the future. 
This Chapter in its first Section sheds some light on the factual situation of both 
cases and evaluates them (3.1). Second Section assesses the reasons which enabled 
treaty shopping in Saluka and stopped it in Phoenix (3.2). Next Section examines the 
definition of ‘investment’ and ‘investor’ as these seems to be the primary causes of 
the problem (3.3). A possible solution to this problem in the form of a denial of 
benefits clause is then examined on a theoretical level (3.4). The last Section 
analyses the concrete formulations of the denial of benefits clause in the Czech 
Republic BITs (3.5). 
                                                 
44
 Matthew Skinner, Cameron A Miles, and Sam Luttrell, ‘Access and advantage in investor-




3.1. FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND EVALUATION OF TRIBUNALS’ 
FINDINGS 
The factual circumstances in Phoenix and Saluka were very different. 
Correspondingly, so were the arguments of the parties and the rulings of the tribunals. 
Phoenix was a classic case of treaty shopping that is condemned. In Saluka, the 
claimant engaged in what appears to be a standard business practice.  
Phoenix was an Israeli company owned by a Czech national, Mr Beno, who 
established the company in 2001.
45
 In 2002, Phoenix purchased two companies from 
another company that happened to be owned by Mr Beno’s wife.
46
 The transaction 
took place at a time when the companies were already subjected to criminal 
investigation.
47
 Phoenix then commenced international arbitration proceedings 
against the Czech Republic.
48
  
The Czech Republic raised objections to the tribunal’s jurisdiction based on 
provisions of the Agreement between the Government of Czech Republic and the 
Government of the State of Israel for the Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of 
Investments
49
 (‘Israel BIT’) that was used in the case and on the Convention on the 
Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals of Other States
50
 
(‘ICSID Convention’). It inter alia claimed that the tribunal had no jurisdiction 
ratione temporis over the claim, Phoenix did not own any investment in the sense of 
the BIT, and that Phoenix did not classify as an investor due to its failure to satisfy 
the diversity of nationality requirement prescribed by the relevant BIT.
51
  
The tribunal found that it lacked the ratione materiae jurisdiction over the dispute, as 
the purported investment did not qualify as protected investment.
52
 Claimant’s 
                                                 
45
 Phoenix Award (n 3) [22]. 
46
 ibid [22], [27]. 
47
 ibid [32]. 
48
 ibid [1]. 
49
 Israel BIT (n 8). 
50
 Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals of 
Other States (adopted 18 March 1965, entered into force 14 October 1966) 575 UNTS 159 
(ICSID Convention). 
51
 Phoenix Award (n 3) [35]. 
52
 ibid [145]. 
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transaction represented an abuse of system, and such action could not be protected.
53
 
It should be mentioned that the tribunal based its decision on the wording of the 
ICSID Convention rather than the Israel BIT.
54
 However, as can be seen later in this 
Section, the case would have been dismissed irrespective of the applicable law.  
In the Saluka case,
55
 Saluka was a Dutch company that was a part of a Japanese 
conglomerate that has operated within the Czech Republic since 1990.
56
 Saluka 
acquired shares in one of the major Czech banks
57
 from another member of the 
conglomerate in 1998.
58




The Czech Republic objected to the notion that the Netherlands BIT based on which 
the case was raised establishes jurisdiction of the tribunal in this case. It claimed that 
Saluka has not made an investment in the Czech Republic
60
 and also that Saluka does 
not constitute an investor as it is not the real party in interest in the arbitration.
61
  
The tribunal dismissed both objections. Firstly it examined the definition of 
investment in the respective BIT and found it did not support respondent’s 
arguments.
62
 Secondly, it refused to deny Saluka the status of a protected investor. It 
came to the conclusion that ‘[t]here is no doubt that Saluka meets the only 
requirements expressly stipulated in [the Netherlands BIT] of the Treaty for 
qualification as an investor’.
63
 
The two cases are examples of treaty shopping as defined on page 10. Skinner 
identifies two categories of treaty shopping. The first one is so called ‘treaty 
shopping at the back end of an investment’. It describes a situation when an investor 
                                                 
53
 ibid [142]–[144]. 
54
 cf ibid [96], [116]. 
55
 For a detailed explanation of the circumstances of the case, cf Vladimir Balaš, ‘Saluka 
Investments B. V. (The Netherlands) v. The Czech Republic, Comments on the Partial 
Arbitral Award of 17 March 2006’ (2006) 7 J. World Investment & Trade 371 (Balaš) 371 – 
375.    
56
 Saluka Award (n 4) [43]. 
57
 ibid [1]. 
58
 ibid [71]. 
59
 ibid [2]. 
60
 ibid [199(a)]. 
61
 ibid [199(c)]. 
62
 ibid [207], [209]. 
63
 ibid [223]. 
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restructures its business after it has become a subject of a dispute.
64
 The other 
category is labelled ‘treaty shopping at the front end of an investment,
65
 which is a 
situation where an investor makes changes in the structure of its business before 
there is any notion of a dispute as a part of a scheme to secure the investment in the 
best way possible.
66
 According this test, Phoenix represented treaty shopping at the 
back end of an investment; Saluka at the front end of an investment. 
Opinions on whether treaty shopping is desirable vary. Dolzer and Schreuer argue 
that in general, there is nothing illegal and unethical about restructuring one’s 
business so as to maximize its protection.
 67
 Douglas states that forum shopping at 
the back end of an investment is impermissible, whereas at the front end of the 
investment is acceptable.
68
 States tend to condemn both practices.
69
 
There are persuasive arguments for frowning upon instances of treaty shopping at the 
back end of an investment. When states offer their protection to investors through 
BITs their conduct is of course not motivated by sheer altruism. They hope to gain 
something in return - investors that will contribute to the economic growth of the 
state. With an investor that engages in the treaty shopping on the back end of an 
investment, state’s effort to boost its economy completely misses its aim. Such 
investor will not help the state’s economic situation in any way. Consequently, when 
an investor acquires an investment with the sole purpose of commencing arbitral 
proceedings, it uses the protection of the BIT for a whole different ultimate reason 




On the other hand, treaty shopping at the front end is understandable and, contrary to 
what states might claim in this matter, justifiable. A typical scenario in this case 
involves an investor that truly intends to conduct its business in another country for a 
certain period of time, thus helping the economy of this country. As every investment 
                                                 
64
 Skinner (n 44) 260. 
65




 Dolzer and Schreuer (n 12) 54. 
68
 Douglas (n 9) [542]. 
69
 Skinner (n 44) 260. 
70
 cf Phoenix Award (n 3) [144]. 
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involves multiple sources of risk, the investor searches for the best way to protect its 
investment against any possible future harm, including interference from the part of 
the state. Since the legal reality created by the system of BITs is that an investment is 
better protected against measures taken by a state if it is owned by an investor 
incorporated in a particular state rather than by an investor from another state, 
including the host state,
71
 the investor decides to channel the investment through 
another entity. 
The states created a system in which they compete to attract investors by offering 
them as favourable conditions as possible from perspective of legal protection. It is a 
similar concept to a situation when the investor evaluates which country has the most 
favourable tax policy, or which country offers the easiest method of incorporating a 
company, and decides to establish its business there. The investors cannot be 
punished for acting on those offers and behaving in a way the states intended them to 
behave. It should therefore come as no surprise that when tribunals are confronted 
with such an investor and they contemplate whether to pronounce the investor 
worthy of a protection of a BIT, they do so.  
Nevertheless, when considering the effectiveness of the provision of BITs from the 
state’s point of view, what matters is the opinion of the state on this practice – 
whether it considers treaty shopping in any form desirable or not. In Saluka, the 
Czech Republic made it clear that it expects protected investors to have a real link to 
its home state, and not to be a mere conduit for the investment.
72
 It seems that the 
Czech Republic did not wish to support any form of treaty shopping, be it the one 
displayed in Phoenix or be it the one from Saluka. 
3.2. REASONS WHY THE TRIBUNAL DECLINED ITS JURISDICTION 
IN PHOENIX AND UPHELD IT IN SALUKA 
To assess whether Czech Republic’s BITs protect the state from treaty shopping, one 
must examine the reasons why the tribunal refused to rule in favour of the claimant 
                                                 
71
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72
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in the case of Phoenix and why it saw itself entitled to hear the claim in the case of 
Saluka. 
As discussed in Section 3.1, the Czech Republic raised several objections to the 
jurisdiction of the tribunal in the Phoenix case. The tribunal focused on one – 
whether the investment allegedly made by Mr Beno was made bona fide. The 
tribunal did not understand this requirement as being prescribed by the ICSID 
Convention which it examined – the Convention itself does not expressly state any 
such condition
73
 – but as prescribed by general principles of international law.
74
 It 
stated that [t]he purpose of the international mechanism of protection of investment 




In order to determine the presence of good faith or a lack thereof, the tribunal took 
several factors into consideration. Among others, it looked at the timing of the 
investment and noted that Phoenix acquired the investment at a time when it was 
already burdened by problems with the authorities.
76
 It also inquired into the timing 
of the claim, which pointed to the fact that the whole scheme was designed with the 
intention to assert an investment arbitration claim.
77
 The nature of the claim 
suggested that Phoenix never intended to perform any economic activity in the Czech 
Republic;
78
 instead, its aim was to bring international litigation against the state.
79
 
These and other factors lead the tribunal to believe the investor was not acting in 
good faith.
80
 In the light of this conclusion, the tribunal was precluded from having 
jurisdiction over the case and did not address other of the respondent’s objections.
81
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Evaluation of tribunal’s findings leads to several observations. Firstly, the Phoenix 
case is a clear cut example of abuse of process.
82
 It would be difficult to imagine the 
tribunal ruling otherwise. Secondly, the reasons behind the dismissal of the claim did 
not depend on the wording of any treaty, but on general principles of international 
law that apply in each and every case. It therefore seems that there is no need for 
including special mechanisms to combat such obvious cases of treaty shopping at the 
back end of an investment into BITs. 
The outcome of the Saluka case was different. Here too did the respondent allege that 
there was no bona fide investment and that the claimant did not classify as an 
investor.
83
 The tribunal first contemplated the presence of an investment. It examined 
Art. 1(a) of the Netherlands BIT, which states: ‘The term ‘investments’ shall 
comprise every kind of asset invested either directly or through an investor of a third 
State.’
84
 The tribunal noted that the definition is very wide.
85
 It dismissed Czech 
Republic’s assertion that there was no intention on the investor’s part to make a true 
investment
86
 as irrelevant, for ‘Even if it were possible to know an investor’s true 
motivation in making its investment, nothing in Article 1 makes the investor’s 
motivation part of the definition of an “investment”’.
87
 For the same reason it 
dismissed the argument that the investment was in fact a mere conduit for an 
investment of the mother company.
88
 The definition of the investment in the 
Netherlands BIT did not compel the tribunal into the economic nature of the 
transaction; the tribunal would exceed its powers if it did so.
89
 
The tribunal then turned its attention to the definition of an investor. It reads: 
‘(b) the term “investors” shall comprise: 
[…] 
                                                 
82
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The respondent stated that despite being a legal person constituted under the laws of 
the Netherlands,
91 
Saluka still did not represent an investor as it was merely a shell 
company and as such was not a bona fide investor.
92
 It invited the tribunal to pierce 
the corporate veil and recognize the real investor, Saluka’s mother company.
93
 The 
tribunal refused to do so. It stressed that it ‘must always bear in mind the terms of the 
Treaty under which it operates’.
94
 The treaty did not allow the tribunal to pierce the 
corporate veil.  
The respondent also complained about the lack of real and continuous link between 
Saluka and the Netherlands for which it allegedly did not qualify as an investor.
95
 In 
a now notorious statement, the tribunal conceded that: 
‘[it] has some sympathy for the argument that a company which has no 
real connection with a State party to a BIT, and which is in reality a 
mere shell company controlled by another company which is not 
constituted under the laws of that State, should not be entitled to 
invoke the provisions of that treaty.’
96
  
But again, the tribunal was unable to go beyond the definition of the investment in 
the BIT and to create an additional requirement of real and continuous link.
97
 
The findings of the Saluka tribunal highlight a difference in understanding of the 
concept of nationality that can be adopted by international investment tribunals and 
in understanding of the problematics endorsed by the International Court of Justice 
(‘ICJ’). In its Nottebohm case,
98
 the ICJ formulated the principle of effective 
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 As can be seen in the Saluka case, in the absence of an express 
statement of this principle in the BITs or ICSID Convention,
 100
 tribunals may be 
reluctant to use the principle.
101
 
Arbitral practice from cases against other states shows a similar approach to forum 
shopping across the world. The tribunal in Mobil Corporation v Venezuela
102
 set a 
clear test regarding permissible treaty shopping:
103
 corporate restructuring is 
perfectly legitimate, as long as it is undergone before the disputes arise.
104
 Tribunals 
in Banro v Congo
105
 and Cementownia v Turkey
106
 followed the same test. Other 
tribunals went further and suggested that the investment lacks good faith even in 
instances when the dispute had not yet arisen, but was foreseeable.
107
  
It can be thus assumed that in the light of the recent arbitral awards, if an investor 
undergoes corporate restructuring with the purpose of getting access to international 
arbitration at the time the dispute was already present or was foreseeable, the 
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tribunals will refuse to hear the claim,
108
 even if not expressly authorized by the 
applicable BIT. States therefore do not necessarily have to redraft their BITs in order 
to prevent treaty shopping at the back end of an investment.  
In the case of treaty shopping at the front end of an investment the situation is 
different. Numerous tribunals were faced with such situation, and like the Saluka 
tribunal, refused to pierce the corporate veil in the absence of a corresponding 
provision in the BIT.
109
  
It therefore remains to be assessed whether the way Czech BITs are drafted enables 
the investors to engage in treaty shopping on the front end of the investment.  
3.3. DEFINITION OF INVESTMENT AND INVESTOR 
As can be seen in the cases of Saluka and Phoenix, treaty shopping is primarily a 
question of the definition of investor and investment in the BITs. Definition of an 
investment as ‘every kind of asset invested by an investor’ and definition of an 
investor as an ‘entity incorporated in one of the contracting parties’ will not give 
grounds for tribunals such as the Saluka tribunal to decline its jurisdiction. 
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Certain provisions of the Saluka award may serve as inspiration for those seeking 
advice on how to structure BITs in order to combat treaty shopping.
110
 The tribunal 
stated: 
‘The parties to the Treaty could have included in their agreed 
definition of “investor” some words which would have served, for 
example, to exclude wholly-owned subsidiaries of companies 
constituted under the laws of third States […].’
111
 
It also suggested that the parties could have agreed on a definition of an investor 
which would require the investor to have a real and continuous link to the state.
112
 
It should be examined whether Czech Republic’s BITs contain definitions that are 
too broad or whether they contain provisions similar to those envisaged by the 
Saluka tribunal. If they are too broad, the question that presents itself is if restricting 
them is indeed the best way to combat treaty shopping.  
Majority of the Czech BITs define investor as an entity incorporated or constituted
113
 
in the territory of the Czech Republic, or as an entity having its seat, permanent seat, 
residence, permanent residence or registered office in the territory of the Czech 
Republic,
114
 or a combination thereof.
115
 They therefore impose only formal 
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 Such definitions are very broad and encourage treaty 




Some BITs go even further and define investor as an entity incorporated under the 
laws of a third country and controlled by a national of or entity incorporated in the 
other contracting party.
118
 This further broadens the number of investors who are 
protected by the BIT and consequently raises the number of ways in which a 
company may undergo corporate restructuring in order to gain access to international 
arbitration. 
Only a minority of Czech BITs impose additional requirements that could prevent 
treaty shopping
119
 such as conducting business activities within territory of the state 
other than the host state or having a head office in that state.
 120
 
As to the definition of investment, most of the BITs are equally wide in this respect 
as in the definition of investor. The most far-reaching definition of investment is 
contained in the Netherlands BIT
 121
 and two other BITs.
122
 They do not describe 
investment in any other way than an asset being ‘invested’, and expressly allow 
indirect investments. The majority of the BITs
123
 have a very similar clause, with the 
difference that they do not expressly mention indirect investment.  
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Only a handful of BITs limit the definition of an investment. Two
124
 understand 
investment only as direct investment. A few BITs mention the element of ownership 
or control,
125
 some expressly mentioning direct or indirect ownership or control.
126
  
More restrictive definitions of investor and investment in the Czech BITs could 
probably to certain extent prevent treaty shopping. So could an introduction of the 
control rule,
127
 under which the nationality of investors is determined by the actual 
person in control,
128
 to the BITs. However, before assessing to which extent these 
would be effective, it is prudent to ask whether regulation through restricting the 
definitions of investor and investment is the most effective way to safeguard the 
Czech Republic against treaty shopping. 
It seems that it is not the best option. There are two reasons for this assertion. Firstly, 
one must keep in mind the purpose for which the system of international investment 
law was created. The states agree to offer protection to investors in the hope of 
attracting them to make investments within their territories, and while doing so 
contribute to the economy of the state. While abuse of the system is a problem, when 
searching for a solution the purpose of the system should not be eradicated. 
Restricting the definitions of investor and investment to the point where any treaty 
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shopping is prohibited might mean painting with a broad brush and deterring more 
investors than desirable. 
Definitions of investor and investments must be extensive enough to encompass all 
possible persons that the state wishes to attract. That is a large and heterogeneous 
group; as such it can be described only in broad terms. It seems more prudent not to 
restrict these broad definitions, but rather insert a new clause that would contain a 
description of investors and investment that the state does not wish to admit. This is a 
much smaller group, and it is therefore easier to identify common features of its 
members and define them. 
Secondly, it should be noted that although the states object to treaty shopping when it 
comes to arbitral proceedings, not all forms of treaty shopping are necessarily 
harmful. Treaty shopping at the front end of an investment may in the end prove 
beneficial to the state.  
The states understandably object to this practice when there is an actual dispute with 
the investor, just as the Czech Republic did in Saluka, as they want to avoid paying 
damages. But if there is no dispute, they do not question who is behind the investor – 
the fact that the investor has no real link to its home state is less important than the 
contribution the investor brings to the local economy.  
Restricting the definitions would deprive the state of all the investors that genuinely 
intend to conduct business in the Czech Republic over an extensive period of time 
and contribute to the state’s economy. Majority od them will never commence 
proceedings against the state, but they deem the ability to do so if need be important 
enough to play a role in their decision where to invest. 
Thirdly, there may be investors who do not primarily seek to engage in treaty 
shopping, but who cannot rule out that after making the investment in a certain state 
they will not want to undergo a corporate restructuring for whichever reasons, or 
move their business away from this state, and only keep a seat there. If the 
definitions are restricted, such investors will know that if they ever engage in a 
similar behaviour, it will mean they will lose the protection of the BIT. Consequently 
they may decide to invest in another country, where they will still be able to benefit 
from the BIT even if they wish to make changes in their business in the future. 
24 
 
The fourth reason is closely connected with the second and third one. If the investor 
does not meet the restrictive requirements set by the BIT, the tribunal will have to 
decline its jurisdiction regardless on whether the investor’s inability to meet the 
criteria is understandable or pardonable. If the investor brings a claim based on a BIT, 
the tribunal must assess its jurisdiction based on the terms of the BIT only,
129
 
irrespective of the fact that even the host state might agree that the putative investor 
should be protected by the BIT. 
The host state and the investor cannot validly change the BIT to the effect that the 
investor will constitute an exception and that the BIT requirements should be 
changed in its case. A BIT is an international treaty and as such can be amended any 
by the contracting parties.
130
 Of course this is not a problem that could not be 
overcome: the other contracting state of the BIT will likely be more than willing to 
assist its investor, or the jurisdiction of the tribunal could be founded by a direct 
agreement between the host state and the investor. However, the whole process will 
be more complicated than just raising a claim based on a BIT.  
In conclusion, changing the definitions of investor and investment in the BITs may 
bring more harm than good. Their restriction would be a very rigid solution to the 
problem of treaty shopping. It seems better to find an entirely different clause that 
will be capable of precisely defining what type of behaviour is undesirable, and at the 
same time will be flexible enough to allow the states to offer protection to those who 
engage in treaty shopping, but nevertheless whose presence is still beneficial for the 
state. 
3.4. DENIAL OF BENEFITS CLAUSES AS A POTENTIAL SOLUTION 
Denial of benefits clauses may be the answer to the above described problem. The 
term designates clauses which allow a state to ‘deny the benefits of the treaty to a 
                                                 
129
 cf the strict adherence to the wording of the BIT demonstrated by the Saluka tribunal - 
Saluka Award (n 4) [229], [241].  
130
 cf Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (adopted 22 May 1969, entered into force 
27 January 1980) 1155 UNTS 331(VCLT) art 39 - all the Czech BITs were concluded after 
the Czech Republic adopted VCLT and after VCLT came into force; VCLT is consequently 
applicable to them. 
25 
 
company which is not controlled from the state of incorporation’
131
 or which does 
not conduct business activities there.  
Denial of benefits clauses represent a more efficient method of preventing investors 
that engaged in treaty shopping from successfully raising a claim. Firstly, it defines 
the small group that is to be deterred, rather than the voluminous group that is to be 
admitted. As such, the definition can be much more focused and precise. The first 
problem described in Section 3.3 is therefore addressed. 
Secondly, the clause allows for flexibility. In order to be effective, it must be invoked 
by the host state. This directly solves the fourth problem described in Section 3.3 
Flexibility is also a solution for the second and third problem that relate to investors 
who wish to engage in treaty shopping as it is the only way their investment can be 
protected, and to investors who do not mean to engage in treaty shopping but cannot 
rule out they will not fulfil the definition in the future. These can contractually agree 
with the state that the clause will not be invoked. 
The denial of benefits clauses represent a right of a state, and as such they may be 
waived. The investors may conclude an agreement with the host state in which the 
state promises it will not invoke the clause in the future. Thus, even if the investors 
meet the definition in the denial of benefits clause, the clause will not be applicable. 
If the agreement was for whichever reason invalid, and state invoked the clause, it 
would show bad faith on the part of the state, which would significantly strengthen 
the position of the investor in the arbitral proceedings. 
The fact that the clause is to be invoked at the state’s discretion may raise concerns 
that it will be used arbitrarily. That is not the case though. The tribunal is still entitled 
to assess whether the investor meets the criteria described in the clause and therefore 
whether the state is at the liberty to invoke the clause. 
For these reasons, the denial of benefit clauses represent a potentially more efficient 
way to prevent treaty shopping. Question is whether they are present in the Czech 
BITs and if so, whether their concrete wording could truly serve their purpose. 
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3.5. DENIAL OF BENEFITS CLAUSES IN CZECH BITS 
Denial of benefits clauses are present in the Agreement between the Czech Republic 
and Canada for the Promotion and Protection of Investments
132
 (‘Canada BIT’), and 
the Treaty Between the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic and the United States of 
America Concerning the Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of Investment 
(‘USA BIT’).
133
 A not so typical form is contained in Agreement between the Czech 
Republic and the Australia on the Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of 
Investments (‘Australia BIT’). 
The clause present in the Canada BIT provides:  
‘Subject to prior notification and consultation in accordance with this 
[BIT], a Contracting Party may deny the benefits of this [BIT] to an 
investor of the other Contracting Party that is an enterprise of such 
Contracting Party and to investments of such investors if investors of a 
third state own or control the enterprise and the enterprise has no 
substantial business activities in the territory of the Contracting Party 
under whose law it is constituted.’
134
 
Less strict rules for its application is contained in the USA BIT: 
‘Each Party reserves the right to deny to any company the advantages 
of this Treaty if nationals of any third country control such company 
and, in the case of a company of the other Party, that company has no 
substantial business activities in the territory of the other Party or is 
controlled by nationals of a third country with which the denying Party 
does not maintain normal economic relations.’135 
The denial of benefits clause in the Australia BIT reads: 
‘Where a company of a Contracting Party is owned or controlled by a 
citizen or a company of any third country, the Contracting Parties may 
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decide jointly in consultation not to extend the rights and benefits of 
this Agreement to such company.’
 136
  
To summarize, the denial of benefits clause in the USA BIT is applicable with 
respect to a company of the other contracting party if the company conducts no 
substantial business activities or is under foreign control; the Canada BIT imposes 
both of these conditions cumulatively, and adds a requirement of prior notification. 
The clause in the Australia BIT operates only upon an agreement of both contracting 
parties.  
The clause in the Australia BIT is the least efficient of the three. If an investor is a 
part of a conglomerate powerful enough to pressure the government of its home state 
not to agree on the application of the clause, the home state may be very reluctant to 
give its consent even in cases of treaty shopping, which, despite not amounting to 
clear cut treaty shopping at the back end of an investment, are questionable.
137
 Also, 
whether the two contracting states agree or not may depend more on diplomatic 
relations between the two states as opposed to the factual situation of the case.  
The structure of denial of benefits clauses contained in the Canada BIT and the USA 
BIT seem more apt to fulfil their purpose than their Australian counterpart. Their 
application does not depend on the will of the other contracting party, but on 
predefined objective conditions. 
However, certain problems may still arise with their application. Arbitral practice so 
far shows that denial of benefits clauses are less effective than it was expected. The 
tribunals found some terms in clauses like the ones in Canada BIT and USA BIT 
ambiguous and interpreted them in favour of the investors.
138
 
The first problematic term is ‘substantial business activities’. Prima facie it appears 
that the term should ensure that companies that serve as a mere conduit for an 
investment should be excluded from the protection of the BIT. The ordinary meaning 
of the word ‘substantial’, according to which the term should be interpreted pursuant 
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to Art. 31(1) of VCLT, is defined by the Collins dictionary as ‘of a considerable size 
or value’.
139
 Nevertheless, tribunals can understand the term differently. The tribunal 
in Limited Liability Company Amto v Ukraine 
140
 stated: 
‘“substantial” in this context means “of substance, and not merely of 
form”. It does not mean “large”, and the materiality not the magnitude 
of the business activity is the decisive question. In the present case, the 
Tribunal is satisfied that the Claimant has substantial business activity 
in Latvia, on the basis of its investment related activities conducted 




Arbitral practice shows that in reality the threshold for what constitutes a substantial 
business activity is indeed not high.
142
 Voon warns that ‘unless the investor is a shell 
company that exists only on paper without any employees, commercial operations, or 
a physical existence (for example, with offices)’
143
 the investor will be found to 
conduct substantial business activities in the territory of its home state.  
The arguments that the Czech Republic raised in Saluka and the word ‘substantial’ in 
the BIT suggests that the Czech Republic did not wish to exclude only companies 
which exist on paper. If that is so and the Czech Republic wishes to deny benefits of 
the BIT to companies which engage in some business activities, e.g. keeping an 
office or employees that serve as an intermediary between the company and its 
parent company, it should clarify the wording of the clause.  
The state could propose to insert examples of what are the signs of substantial 
business activities, such as a certain turn-over generated in the home state. 
Investment arbitration is a very costly thing and as such it is primarily used by 
investors with substantial financial resources. Should an investor who commences 
arbitration have a surprisingly low turn-over, it could point to the fact that it does not 
conduct business in its home state. Another possible solution is to look at business 
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activities of the mother company together with other companies controlled by it. The 
denial of benefits clause could state that if the investor conducts a disproportionally 
small part of the group, the investor could be denied the benefits of the BIT. 
The second problematic term, which is contained in the Canada BIT, is ‘subject to 
prior notification’. The word ‘prior’ insinuates that the notification must be given 
before the dispute occurs. It is not difficult to imagine the reason behind this clause; 
each contracting party wants to secure the best conditions for conducting business for 
its investors and this caveat in the clause ensures that the investors know whether 
they enjoy the benefits of the BIT or not.  
In practice, this formulation has a rather burdensome effect. In order to be able to 
give the notification and to rely on the clause in the future, the Czech Republic has to 
have the information necessary to assess whether the notice should be given. It needs 
to actively monitor all the investors in its territory or at least order them to report 
whether they are engaging in any business activities in their home countries. Such 
behaviour could take a substantial amount of resources.  
To make the clause more effective while retaining its effect, the responsibility should 
be shifted from the state on the investor. There should not be any requirement of 
prior notification; instead, there should be an option for the investor to negotiate an 
agreement with the state if the investor wishes to ensure the clause will not be 
applicable in its case. 
Troublingly, the requirement of prior written notification has been found by tribunals 
even in cases when the BIT did not expressly contain it. The tribunal in Plama 
Consortium Limited v Republic of Bulgaria stated that the phrase ‘have a right to 
deny’ means that in order to operate, the right has to be actively exercised
 
by a 
notification to the investor.
 144
 The right is effective only after the notification has 
taken place.
 145
 If the state wishes to avoid having to monitor and notify all investors, 
not only it should omit the requirement of prior notification, but it should expressly 
add that no prior notification is required. 
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In conclusion, one of the problems the Czech Republic has encountered in arbitral 
practice was the one of treaty shopping. There are two types of this practice: treaty 
shopping at the front end of the investment, which is in general not condemned by 
scholars and tribunals, and treaty shopping at the back end of an investment, which 
amounts to abuse of the system of investment arbitration. Based on Czech Republic’s 
argumentation in Saluka, the Czech Republic wishes to avoid both types of treaty 
shopping.  
Treaty shopping in enabled by broad definitions of investment and investor in BITs. 
The majority of Czech BITs are not capable of stopping the Saluka scenario from 
happening again. If the Czech Republic seeks to prevent the investors from engaging 
in treaty shopping, it should include denial of benefits clauses the likes of which can 
be found in the Canada BIT and the USA BIT with specifications of what is meant 
by substantial business activities and with express exclusion of the requirement of 
prior written notification.  
4. TWO DIFFERENT PROCEEDINGS COMMENCED BY ONE 
ULTIMATE INVESTOR 
The second problem that has emerged in the case law against the Czech Republic 
that will be discussed in this work is the problem of parallel proceedings. Purported 
safeguards in Czech Republic’s BITs failed to prevent the instance of parallel 
proceedings in cases Lauder and CME.  
Two intertwined investors, Mr Ronald S Lauder and CME Czech Republic B.V. 
(‘CME’) commenced two proceedings against the Czech Republic. In both 
proceedings, the claimants complained about same set of measures taken by the 
Czech Republic with respect to the same ultimate investment. In both cases the state 
objected to jurisdiction of the tribunal and admissibility of the case on the basis that 
the claimant should not be allowed to commence two parallel arbitrations.  
In each of the cases the Czech Republic built its argumentation in a slightly different 
way. In CME, due to the absence of any suitable provision in the BIT, the respondent 
31 
 
had to back up its arguments with references to principles of international law.
146
 In 
Lauder the Czech Republic tried to rely on the BIT in question.
147




This Chapter aims to assess the reasons behind the failure of Czech Republic’s 
arguments to convince the tribunals and to find mechanism that could prevent this 
situation from reoccurring in the future. The first Section describes the factual 
situation of the case and evaluates it (4.1). The next Section examines the legal 
causes that enabled Mr Lauder and CME to initiate and continue in the proceedings 
(4.2). The third Section then contemplates possible solutions to the problem that the 
two cases demonstrated (4.3).  
4.1. FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND EVALUATION OF TRIBUNALS’ 
FINDINGS 
Lauder and CME both emerged from actions of the Czech Media Council in respect 
to granting a broadcasting licence to and supervision of a company called Česká 
nezávislá televizní společnost, spol. s.r.o. CME held a major interest in this 
company,
149




Mr Lauder commenced proceedings against the Czech Republic on 19 August 
1999
151
 based on the USA BIT. CME then initiated another proceedings on 22 
February 2000
152
 based on the Netherlands BIT. Both tribunals upheld their 
jurisdiction, and the cases were decided differently on the merits.  
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The situation created in Lauder and CME
153
 closely resembles a so called lis alibi 
pendens situation. Lis alibi pendens has been defined as a ‘situation in which parallel 
proceedings, involving the same parties and the same cause of action, are continuing 
in two different states at the same time’.
154
 There are different forms, in which lis 
alibi pendens can occur: parallel proceedings can be conducted by an arbitral tribunal 
and by a state court, or by two arbitral tribunals, or by an arbitral tribunal and a 
supra-national court.
155
 The situation at hand was similar to the second form of lis 
alibi pendens. 
However, it was not a pure lis alibi pendens situation. It is important to appreciate 
that even though interlinked, the claimants were formally different and the causes of 
action (the BITs) were also different. Thus, the parties were not the same and neither 
was the cause of action. 
CME-Lauder situation and lis alibi pendens situations in general are not desirable for 
several reasons. Firstly, looking from the greater perspective of the system of 
international arbitration, if the two proceedings have different outcomes, it will 
create a situation of legal uncertainty.
156
 Different outcomes of cases with identical 
factual situations decided based on a comparable law show how differently the 
regulation can be perceived by different arbitrators, which in turn shows that the 
result of proceedings may be a matter of chance rather than law and factual 
circumstances.  
The ramifications of such discrepancy of outcomes are amplified by the absence of a 
universal appellate system or of an authoritative body which could render a final 
decision regarding the understanding and application of law. CME and Lauder 
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expose flaws in the international investment arbitration system, which can undermine 
its credibility and bring about confusion.  
Secondly, from the state’s perspective, commencement of proceedings stemming 
from the same set of measures by related investors such as in CME and Lauder is 
perceived as an abuse of the system.
157
 One should keep in mind that investment 
arbitration proceedings are asymmetrical – the role of the claimant is in reality 
always assumed by the investor and consequently states find themselves only in the 
position of the respondent. When it comes to arbitration, the state has nothing to win; 
only to lose. This is by no means to suggest that the whole system of protection of 
international investment is askew in favour of the investor. The existence of BITs is 
beneficial for states; through BITs, they seek to encourage investors to make 
investments in their territory. They do so by guaranteeing certain rights on an 
international level and by promising that should these rights be breached, an investor 
can have its case heard by an impartial tribunal.  
However, a system which cannot prevent CME-Lauder scenario allows for a 
situation when an investor makes several attempts on recovering damages through 
various subsidiaries. The investor can thus raise its chances of success by simply 
raising another claim under a different BIT though a related company. Multiplying 
the number of tribunals that hear virtually the same case means creating more 




Given the fact that different tribunals may have widely different opinions on the 
matter, such behaviour may be effective. Even more so if the case raises one of the 
many issues in international investment law on which the public opinion remains 
divided. The MFN clause that is elaborated on in Chapter 5 is a prime example of 
such question; another important example is the umbrella clause.
159
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It is possible to imagine a situation where an investor goes even one step further than 
in CME and Lauder and actually waits for the outcome of the first case before it 
raises a second claim. Prima facie such behaviour may seem destined to fail; an 
examination of tribunals’ language in the said cases however reveals that such 
claimant may be successful. It is apparent that the tribunals (for reasons further 
described in Section 4.2) did not feel obliged to consider whether a similar case has 
been submitted to a different tribunal when it came to their jurisdiction over the cases 
and admissibility thereof.  
In CME, the tribunal stated: 
‘A party may seek its legal protection under any scheme provided by 
the laws of the host country. The Treaty [under which the case was 
decided] as well as the US Treaty [that was the basis for the other 
proceedings] are part of the laws of the Czech Republic and neither of 
the treaties supersedes the other. Any overlapping of the results of 
parallel processes must be dealt with on the level of loss and quantum 
but not on the level of breach of treaty.’
160
  
The Lauder tribunal pronounced as follows: 
‘The existence of numerous parallel proceedings does in no way affect 
the Arbitral Tribunal’s authority and effectiveness, and does not 
undermine the Parties’ rights. On the contrary, the present proceedings 
are the only place where the Parties’ rights under the Treaty can be 
protected.’
161
    
Through these findings the tribunals sent a rather clear message to investors: they 
may take advantage of the protection the host state gives them on multiple occasions. 
Consequently, the state might find itself haunted by ramifications of certain measures 
it had taken over and over again, which is undoubtedly not a situation the states 
desired when they concluded BITs. 
                                                                                                                                          
(Decision of the Tribunal on Objections to Jurisdiction of 6 August 2003) ICSID Case No 
ARB/01/13. 
160
 CME Partial Award (n 6) [419]. 
161
 Lauder Award (n 5) [174]. 
35 
 
Of course, this scheme is not risk-free for the investor. It might end up losing all of 
the proceedings and facing the obligation to reimburse the state for the costs of 
arbitration, which can be substantial. Still, the cost-benefit analysis of the situation 
may lead to the conclusion that this attempt is worth the risk, especially if the amount 
of damages sought is high. In the case of Mr Lauder, commencing several 
proceedings indeed paid off. In both proceedings Mr Lauder had to pay a half of the 
arbitral fees ($ 250,685.1 in Lauder
162
 and $ 675 601.72 in CME
163
) together with the 
costs of its own legal representation;
164
 in Lauder he also paid half of the costs 
involved in direct hearing.
165




Investor may also have other motives for commencing additional proceedings. More 
proceeding can put the state under more pressure and the state may therefore be 
easily persuaded to agree to a settlement.
167
 
States rightfully deem a conduct the likes of the above described as abusive, as it 
uses the system in a way for which it was not created. Through concluding BITs, the 
states wished to assure the investor that should it believe its rights had been violated, 
it could seek remedies in a forum that is as independent and just as possible. They 
did not mean to create a situation in which an investor may get as many shots on 
recovering damages as it needs to in order be satisfied.  
Thirdly, parallel proceedings represent a problem as they create additional expenses 
on the part of the state; instead of dealing with one proceedings the state has to 
dedicate its limited resources to handle two. Even in the ideal situation where the 
state is in the end fully reimbursed for the sum it took to take part in the proceedings, 
it would be desirable if there were not any costs to begin with.  
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The Czech Republic bore more costs than it would have had if there had been only 
one proceedings. As mentioned above, as a result of the CME Award, it had to pay 
$ 269,814,000 in damages, plus interest, plus arbitrators fees in the amount of $ 675 
601.72.
168
 However, it did not end there. In Lauder, the claims were mostly 
dismissed, but the respondent was still found to have breached the BIT.
169
 Although 
the breach did not give rise to any damages,
170
 it prompted the tribunal to decide that 
each party has to bear its own costs of legal representation, half of the direct costs 
involved in the hearing, and $ 250,685 in the fees and expenses of the tribunal.
171
 
It should be stated that when it comes to the damages, if the state was ordered to pay 
damages in both of the proceedings, it would not be required to reimburse the 
claimant twice in full. As the tribunal in Lauder suggests,
172
 the second tribunal 
would be expected to take into consideration the amount the respondent was already 
ordered to pay when it assess damages. 
For the three above described reasons, the situation when an investor is able to raise 
multiple claims based on one set of events represents a problem not only for the state, 
but also for the system of international investment law in general, and therefore it 
should be prevented.  
4.2. THE LEGAL CIRCUMSTANCES BEHIND MR LAUDER’S 
COMMENCEMENT OF TWO PROCEEDINGS 
In order to examine possible solutions of the situation, their effectiveness and 
feasibility, one must first assess which legal factors enabled Mr Lauder to seek 
damages in two different proceedings. Let us therefore inquire into the mechanisms 
which the Czech Republic attempted to invoke in CME and in Lauder in order to 
prevent two proceedings from taking place, and into the reasons why these 
mechanisms failed. 
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The CME Award does not reveal much from respondent’s argumentation in the case. 
According to the CME Award, the Czech Republic argued that ‘It is an abuse of the 
Bilateral Investment Treaty regime for Mr. Lauder, who purportedly controls CME, 
and, subsequently, CME to bring virtually identical claims under two separate 
treaties.’
173
 Later in the Award it can be found that the respondent labelled claimant’s 
actions as impermissible treaty shopping.
174
 One can imagine that due to the lack of 
appropriate instruments in the BIT in question, the respondent had to resolve to 
support its case with general principles. 
The tribunal was not convinced by these arguments; it stated that there was no abuse 
of process in this case. Although the claimant raised two claims in different foras, it 
repeatedly requested to consolidate both proceedings. The Czech Republic did not 
agree
175
 as it wanted to assert the right to have each action determined independently 
and promptly.
176
 The tribunal also declined to classify claimant’s actions as treaty 
shopping. In the part of the Award already quoted in Section 4.1 it stated that the 
claimant was merely using all means as defending its investment that the state gave 
him, which is permissible.
 177
 
In Lauder, the Czech Republic had more to build on in the terms of BIT provisions 
than in the previous case. It attempted to invoke Art VI(3)(a) of the USA BIT,
178
 
which states:   
‘[…] Once the national or company concerned has so consented, either 
party to the dispute may institute such proceeding provided: 
(i) the dispute has not been submitted by the national or company for 
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The tribunal however did not find that this article prevented Mr Lauder from raising 
the claim. The provision was meant to avoid situation where the same investment 
dispute would be submitted to a different tribunal by the same claimant against the 
same respondent.
180
 The Lauder case and the CME case involved not only different 
parties,
181




An examination of the findings of the tribunal described above leads to the 
conclusion that there were several circumstances here, which each in its own part and 
also in their combination enabled Mr Lauder to commence one proceedings in his 
own name and other via a company he controlled. They can be summarized in three 
points. 
The first and most apparent is the lack of effective mechanisms in the BITs which 
would have enabled the tribunals to decline their jurisdiction or declare the claims 
inadmissible by the virtue of factually identical proceedings that were pending in 
front of another tribunal. Secondly, it is the fact that the Czech Republic refused to 
consolidate the two proceedings.
183
 Thirdly, as Sacerdoti suggests, the CME-Lauder 
scenario was possible as one of the BITs in questions allowed claims to be raised by 
an indirect investor.
184
 Mr Lauder was therefore entitled to raise a claim regarding an 
investment that he owned through several other companies.  
Out of the three circumstances, only the first one will be elaborated on in this 
Chapter, as it pertains directly to the question of jurisdiction and admissibility. The 
second reason was a result of Czech Republic’s own decision and it does not relate to 
the wording of any of the respective BITs; it is also a question of the procedural rules 
that were used in both cases. It will therefore not be further examined as it 
outstretches the scope of this work. The third reason is connected to definitions of an 
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investor in Czech Republic’s BITs; their drawbacks are described in Chapter 3; this 
Chapter shall not revisit them again.  
As it follows, there is one problem that the cases of CME and Lauder present which 
shall be scrutinize further in this Chapter. It is the fact that the Czech Republic was 
unable to rely on its own BITs to prevent what it described as abuse of the system. 
Neither of the BITs in question contained a provision which would have given either 
of the tribunals a legal ground for declining to hear the case due to the lack of 
jurisdiction or for dismissing it for its inadmissibility. The question which now 
presents itself is whether there are such mechanisms in other of Czech Republic’s 
BITs on which the state could rely should a different investor attempt to take Mr 
Lauder’s example. If the answer is negative, it should be assessed whether similar 
tools are present in BITs concluded between other states and whether the Czech 
Republic could adopt them as well.  
4.3. POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS TO CME-LAUDER SCENARIO 
Searching for clauses that could prevent the CME-Lauder scenario from reoccurring 
means searching for clauses that address a situation very similar, but not identical, to 
lis alibi pendens situation. Its particularity lies in the fact that the claimants in both 
cases are related, yet not identical, and the cause of the disputes is the same actions 
adopted by the state, yet the disputes relate to different BITs.  
There are special types of clauses that may solve certain types of lis alibi pendens 
situations.
185
 They allow tribunals to refuse to hear or dismiss a claim under certain 
circumstances due to another pending proceedings. The first of these clauses are so 
called fork-in-the-road provisions explored in Subsection 4.3.1; the second are 
waiver clauses, which are inspected in Subsection 4.3.2; and the third is a clause 
presented in Art. 10(5)(b) of the Canada BIT described in Subsection 4.3.3. 
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4.2.1.     Fork-in-the-Road Provisions 
The first type of clauses that is designed to prevent lis alibi pendens situation is the 
fork-in-the-road clause. This provision typically requires that investor decides 
whether it shall submit its claim to domestic courts of the host state, or whether it 
will bring its claim to international arbitration.
 186
 Once made, the choice is final; if 
the investor chooses to submit its dispute to one of the foras, any other tribunal is 
precluded from having jurisdiction over the matter.
187
  
Fork-in-the-road provisions are structured in two ways in Czech Republic’s BITs. In 
the first case, they are part of the dispute resolution clause, where they add another 
condition under which a disagreement between an investor and a state can be 
resolved by an arbitral tribunal. The second type of fork-in-the-road provision sees 
the clause as a separate one in the sense that it is not incorporated in the dispute 
resolution provision; however it is still closely connected to the dispute resolution 
clause
188
 as it could not operate without it.  
The first form of a fork-in-the-road clause is present in the Art. VI(3)(a) of the USA 
BIT, which was examined in Lauder. This combination of a dispute resolution clause 
and a fork-in-the-road clause states that a dispute cannot be submitted to an arbitral 
tribunal if it had been previously ‘submitted by [the investor] for resolution in 
accordance with any applicable previously agreed dispute settlement procedures; and 
[the investor] has not brought the dispute [before domestic tribunals of the host 
state].
189
 Such clause is not unique among Czech Republic’s BITs; two other 
agreements contain a very similar provision: the Agreement between the Czech 
Republic and the United Mexican States on the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection 
of Investments (‘Mexico BIT’),
 190
 and the Agreement between the Czech Republic 
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The second type of the fork-in-the-road provision is present in several other Czech 
BITs. It works in conjunction with a dispute resolution clause which is structured in a 
way so as to provide an investor – future claimant with a choice of alternative 
judicial foras to take its dispute to.
192
 An example of such dispute resolution clause 
can be found in Art. 8(2) of the Agreement between the Government of the Czech 
Republic and the Government of the Republic of Chile on the Reciprocal Promotion 
and Protection of Investments (‘Chile BIT’): 
‘[…] the investor may submit the dispute either: 
(a) to the competent tribunal of the Contracting party in whose territory 
the investment was made; or 
(b) to the international arbitration of the International Centre for 
Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) […]; or 
(c) an arbitrator or international ad hoc arbitral tribunal established 
under the Arbitration Rules of the United Nations Commission on 
International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) […].’
193
  
The actual fork-in-the-road provisions are then found later in the BIT; their purpose 
is to make the choice of the forum offered in the dispute resolution clause final. Their 
specific wording differs. Some state that once an investor has made its choice and 
submitted its dispute to either domestic courts or international arbitral tribunal, the 
choice is final.
194
 Others allow withdrawing the claim from domestic courts in 
accordance with laws of the host state, if the choice was made to that effect, but 
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Regardless of the differences in their wordings, the provisions are all to the same 
effect: they do not allow the same claimants to submit a dispute regarding the same 
BIT to a different investment arbitration forum again.
197
  
As it was shown in Section 4.2, the fork-in-the-road provision did not work in CME-
Lauder scenario. Spoorenberg submits that the lis alibi pendens principle, which is 
the main idea behind fork-in-the-road clauses, has been interpreted rather strictly 
here,
198
 and suggests that at least the CME tribunal could have adopted a broader 
interpretation.
199
 However, it seems that in the Lauder case, it was not the 
interpretation of the principle that was strict; it was the wording of the clause. The 
rules of interpretation gave the tribunal no other choice as how to understand the 
provision.  
The USA BIT as an international treaty is to be interpreted pursuant to the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties (‘VCLT’).
 200
 Art. 31 of the VCLT states that 
expressions in treaties shall be interpreted pursuant to their ordinary meaning.  
The examination of expressions in the respective provisions and their context reveals 
the following: the fork-in-the-road clauses and dispute resolution clauses to which 
they are connected contain expressions such as ‘either party to the dispute may 
institute […] proceedings’
201
, ‘investor may submit the dispute’
202
, ‘[dispute] may be 
submitted, upon a request of an investor’
203
, ‘the investor shall be entitled to submit 
the case’
204
, and ‘the investor shall be entitled to submit the dispute’
205
.  
These expressions are used to specifically prescribe conditions under which arbitral 
proceedings can be commenced, in the sense that they state who can or cannot be the 
claimant in future arbitral proceedings and also which matter the proceedings shall or 
shall not resolve. The clauses only operate if the claimant is the ‘investor’ and when 
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the proceedings concern the ‘dispute’ (‘case’). In another words, in order for the 
clause to preclude tribunal’s jurisdiction, the dispute (meaning legal dispute) and the 
claimant in both cases must be identical.
206
 Consequently, there are three reasons 
why none of these clauses is applicable in CME-Lauder scenario – a situation where 
a claimant raises a second claim through an affiliate incorporated in a different 
country and protected by a different BIT. 
Firstly, the criterion of identity of the dispute is not met as the cases of CME and 
Lauder revolved around two different disputes. The term dispute in the legal sense of 
the word is understood as a dispute over the observation and interpretations of a 
certain legal rule.
207
 Therefore, it is necessarily connected to a particular BIT. The 
term ‘dispute’ is even specifically described as such in certain BITs. For example, 
Art. 8(1) of the Chile BIT describes the term disputes as ‘disputes, which arise within 




Other BITs connect the term ‘dispute’ to the particular agreement indirectly. They 
describe a ‘dispute’ as a dispute raised in connection with an ‘investment’.
209
 The 
word ‘investment’ is then defined in each of the BITs in question, making it a legal 
term which can only operate within the framework of this one BIT. If an investor 
raises another claim under a different BIT, then by default this other claim involves 
another subject (investment), defined by a different BIT.   
Secondly, the criterion of identical claimants in both cases is not met. The claimants 
in the Lauder-CME scenario were two separate legal entities. In order for the clause 
to operate in this case, its wording would have to encompass not only the investor as 
defined by the BIT, but also entities connected with the claimant. Alternatively, the 
definition of investor itself would have to be changed to grant the tribunal the power 
to inquire into the structure of the claimants to find if they are owned or controlled 
by another entity to which the definition would stretch as well. The fork-in-the-road 
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clauses contained in Czech Republic’s BITs do not allow the former alternative. The 
definitions of investor are also insufficient to stop claimants from submitting 
multiple claims; as apparent from their examination conducted in Chapter 3.3. 
There is also a third reason why a tribunal in a position of the Lauder tribunal could 
refuse to apply a fork-in-the-road clause, albeit this argument was not discussed in 
the case. The clause strictly speaking forbids the investor to institute only the second 
proceedings. This reason is more prominent with the first form of fork-in-the-road-
provisions as discussed on page 41. These clauses are worded to the effect that they 
allow a claimant to submit the claim unless it was already submitted elsewhere. 
However, when the claim is submitted, the provision does not compel the tribunal to 
take into consideration whether other proceedings have been instituted and it does 
not lay grounds for refusing to hear or dismissing the first claim.  
The second form of fork-in-the-roads provisions appears to be less conclusive in this 
matter. This type of clause follows up on a dispute resolution clause that presents an 
investor with alternative choices of foras by pronouncing the choice ‘definitive’. If a 
first tribunal was notified that second proceedings were instituted, it could decide to 
interpret the clause in a manner to render the first claim inadmissible. 
The above analysis shows that the fork-in-the-road provisions are not a suitable 
solution to a problem the likes of CME and Lauder cases. Despite what states might 
claim these provisions were intended for,
210
 they do not cover situations when a 
claimant institutes multiple proceedings through other companies it controls under 
different BITs.  
The provisions would thus require significant adjustments in order to be applicable in 
a scenario similar to the one in Lauder and CME. The main problem with the fork-in-
the-road provisions is that the application of the clause requires the dispute to be 
identical, therefore necessarily confines its scope of application to disputes arising 
out of the same BIT. In order to solve the problem, not only fork-in-the-roads 
provisions would have to be changed, but in some cases also the dispute resolution 
clauses. The definition of an investor would have to be changed too.  
                                                 
210
 cf Lauder Award (n 5) [156]. 
45 
 
Although this is theoretically possible, changing the fork-in-the-road provisions does 
not appear to be the best solution. Fork-in-the-road provisions are simply meant to 
address a specific problem – classic lis alibi pendens situation. Although the Lauder-
CME situations are similar to it, they ultimately have different features. Rather than 
expanding one clause that is meant to address specific situation in order to address a 
different situation as well, and thus creating a broad and complicated clause, it seems 
better to add a different clause that would address this specific situation. A look into 
the international pool of BITs reveals that there are alternatives to fork-in-the-road 
clauses which may be much more suitable. 
4.2.2.     Waiver Clause 
One alternative to the fork-in-the-road provisions is a so called waiver clause. This is 
a clause that conditions the investor’s ability to raise a claim by its waiving the right 
to commence other proceedings or continue therein. A waiver limits the investor’s 
options to raise a claim to one single forum; it thus prevents the classic lis alibi 
pendens situation,
211
 and depending on the wording of the clause, may even be 
effective against situations such as the one in CME-Lauder. 
A waiver clause is similar to a fork-in-the-road clause in the sense that it seeks to 
limit the investor to his earlier choices.
212
 As they both have (to certain extend) the 
same effect, BITs tend to contain either one or the other – Czech Republic’s BITs 
that contain a waiver clause do not contain a fork-in-the-road provision.
213
 Both 
however operate in a different way; contrary to a fork-in-the-road clause, the waiver 
clause requires the investor to actively give up its rights to constitute different 
proceedings under certain circumstances. 




Art. 10(5)(a) of the Canada BIT reads: 
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‘An investor may submit a claim under this Article to arbitration only 
if the investor and, where the claim is for loss or damage to an interest 
in an enterprise that is a juridical person which the investor owns or 
controls directly or indirectly, the enterprise, waive their right to 
initiate or continue before any administrative tribunal or court under 
the law of any Contracting Party, or other dispute settlement 
procedures, any proceedings with respect to the measure of the 
disputing Contracting Party that is alleged to be a breach referred to in 
paragraph 1 of this Article, except for procedures for injunctive, 
declaratory or other extraordinary relief, not involving the payment of 
damages, before an administrative tribunal or court under the law of 
the disputing Contracting Party.’
215
 
Similar clause can be found in Art. 10(4) of the Mexico BIT. 
These waiver clauses are designed to prevent the classic lis alibi pendens situation. 
They lay down the choice between ‘other dispute settlement procedures’, which, in 
the absence any other specification, should encompass international investment 
tribunals as well. Their wording however reaches also beyond lis alibi pendens 
scenario.  
The clauses seem to address the problems described in Section 4.2.1. Firstly, the 
requirement of an identical dispute is no longer present. The legal cause of a dispute 
which fixates the clause to cases of a breach of one specific BIT is no longer of 
interest to the tribunal. Instead, the focus is now on the conduct of the host state of 
which the investor complains. The object of these waiver clauses does not revolve 
around a ‘dispute’, but rather around a ‘measure’ that ‘is alleged to be in breach’.  
Had this clause been present in the USA BIT based on which the Lauder case was 
decided or in the Netherlands BIT used in the CME case, the condition of the identity 
of measures would have been complied with; Mr Lauder and CME complained of the 
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same actions taken by the Czech Republic.
216
 The same sets of measured could no 
longer form basis of a different claim. 
The second problem, the requirement that the second proceedings must be instituted 
by the same claimant, is also addressed in the waiver clauses. The clauses expand the 
definition of entities which are not allowed to raise the claim again. It is no longer 
just the investor; under certain circumstances, it is also any enterprise owned or 
controlled directly and indirectly by the investor. The condition here is that the claim 
is for loss or damage to interest in the said enterprise.  
In CME and Lauder cases, Mr Lauder controlled the company CME, who suffered 
the damage. In the CME case, CME complained about the loss it suffered; in the 
Lauder case, Mr Lauder complained of the loss it suffered on its investment in CME. 
Under a waiver clause, both Mr Lauder and also CME would have to waive the right 
to initiate other proceedings. 
The third problem which the fork-in-the-road provisions could potentially be facing, 
that the clause only forbade the second proceedings from being instituted, but did not 
strictly speaking require the first proceedings to be discontinued, is also solved by 
the waiver clause. Here the investor and the related enterprise waive their right to 
both initiate and continue another proceedings. To prevent the CME-Lauder scenario 
from reoccurring, it will suffice if a waiver clause is present in either of the BITs 
based on which the investor raises its claim. 
As shown above, the waiver clause, just as the fork-in-the-road clause, is capable of 
solving a classic lis alibi pendens situation. In addition, the waiver clause is also 
structured to stop situations that are similar, but not quite lis alibi pendens; they 
focus on the allegedly illegal conduct of a state and extend also to entities different 
from the investor. Including a waiver clause with a wording similar to the one in 
Canada and Mexico BIT could make it impossible for investors to initiate multiple 
claims under different BITs through its subsidiaries and consequently deter investor 
from even attempting such move. 
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4.2.3.     Art. 10(5)(b) of the Canada BIT 
Although a waiver clause could be effective in preventing parallel proceedings such 
as CME-Lauder from taking place, the clause was not designated specifically for this 
problem. A further scrutiny of Czech Republic’s BITs reveals that there is another 
clause which could have been designed precisely with this scenario in mind – Art. 10 
(5)(b) of the Canada BIT. 
Art. 10(5)(b) of the Canada BIT provides:  
‘If an investment is held indirectly through an investor of a third state 
by an investor of one Contracting Party in the territory of the other 
Contracting Party, the investor of a Contracting Party may not initiate 
or continue a proceeding under this Article if the investor of the third 
state submits or has submitted a claim with respect to the same 
measure or series of measures under any agreement between the other 
Contracting Party and the third state.’
217
  
If such a clause had been contained in the USA BIT, it would have been applicable in 
Lauder. Mr Lauder was an investor of one contracting party – the United States of 
America, who held an investment indirectly through CME, an investor of a third state 
– the Netherlands. Under this clause, once he instituted the second proceedings 
through CME, he would not be allowed to continue in the first proceedings and the 
proceedings would have to be stayed. 
This wording of this clause addresses all three problems which arose (or could have 
arisen) with the fork-in-the-road provision. Firstly, as the waiver clause does, it 
defines what constitutes identical claims based on the factual situation – the 
measures taken by the host state, rather than the legal one (identical BITs in both 
cases). Secondly, it is designed for a situation when the claim is raised by two 
different claimants that are interlinked in a way that one controls the other. Thirdly, 
this clause allows the tribunal not only to refuse to hear the second proceedings, but 
to stay the first proceedings as well, thus making it irrelevant which proceedings 
have been instituted first.  
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However, a thorough examination of the strict wording of the provision reveals that 
the clause raises two new problems: firstly, it would only be effective in Lauder, not 
in CME. Art. 10(5)(b) Canada BIT forbids only the ultimate controller to commence 
another proceedings. It does not reach to the investor who serves as a conduit for the 
investment. This problem could be solved by extending the wording of the clause to 
the effect that it would preclude tribunal’s jurisdiction over a claim raised also by an 
investor of the contracting party that is owned or controlled by an investor of a third 
state, under the condition that the controlling investor of the third state also raises the 
claim.  
The second problem is that if a clause like this with the modification described in the 
previous paragraph is present in both of the BITs that govern the proceedings, it 
could lead to a situation where both of the tribunals could feel obliged to decline 
jurisdiction. If the clause is strictly formulated and leaves the tribunal no choice to 
soften its effects, then once the second proceedings were instituted, both of the 
proceedings would have to be stayed. The investor that is factually behind both of the 
claims will be entirely deprived of protection.  
While it is not desirable that an investor abuses the system by commencing multiple 
proceedings, it seems unjustifiably harsh to punish the investor for this behaviour by 
stripping it of any chances of defending its investment. The protection of the 
investment should still stand, the states should only ensure that this protection cannot 
be abused. Even though it is highly likely that if faced with this problem, the 
tribunals would adopt a broad interpretation of the clause and only one of the 
proceedings would be stayed, in order to secure that investor will indeed have access 
to protection in any case, this problem should be addressed in the wording of the 
respective provision. It could be solved by adding a caveat to the clause stating that 
the clause applies unless the other investor waives its right to continue in the other 
set of proceedings. 
In conclusion, Lauder and CME presented the investment arbitration system in the 
Czech Republic with a specific problem of parallel proceedings. Such parallel 
proceedings are undesirable for several reasons: they create legal uncertainty and can 
undermine the faith in the whole system; they represent an abuse of the protection 
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that has been offered to investors by the Czech Republic; and they create huge and 
unnecessary expenses. 
The USA BIT and the Netherlands BIT used in the two cases did not contain 
mechanisms that could, in the tribunals’ opinions, prevent the situation. An 
examination of the other BITs concluded by the Czech Republic shows that the vast 
majority of them would also be unable to prevent the Lauder-CME scenario from 
happening. Only a few BITs contain clauses that could be effective in this situation - 
the waiver clauses. Although the waiver clauses are formulated in a way as to 
encompass a range of possible situation, the problem that the Czech Republic was 
confronted with could be one of them. A unique mechanism that seems to be 
designed specifically to target investors like Mr Lauder is contained in the Canada 
BIT.  
If the Czech Republic wishes to avoid a situation similar to the one created by cases 
of CME and Lauder in the future, it needs to modify its BITs. Rather than adjusting 
existing fork-in-the road provisions or inserting these where they are not present, the 
most effective way seems to insert either waiver clauses or clauses such as the one in 
Art. 10(5)(b) of the Canada BIT with slight adjustments. Waiver clauses may be a 
more prudent choice, as they encompass a wider range of situations, thus protecting 
the state in more ways than a clause modelled after Art. 10(5)(b) of the Canada BIT.  
5. MOST-FAVOURED-NATION CLAUSES 
The application of a most-favoured-nation (‘MFN’) clauses represents the third issue 
examined by this work. The MFN clause is a treaty provision ‘whereby a State 
undertakes an obligation towards another State to accord most-favoured-nation 
treatment in an agreed sphere of relations.’
218
 The clause ensures that an investor is 
treated at least as favourably as an investor of a third state that has also concluded a 
BIT with the host state.
219
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The tribunal in the case of Frontier Petroleum was presented with a question whether 
the agreed sphere of relations covered by the MFN clause included dispute resolution. 
In another words, the tribunal was asked to assess whether the jurisdiction of the 
tribunal could be established by a dispute resolution clause present in a different BIT 
by the virtue of the MFN clause. The respondent submitted that the clause did not 
extend to jurisdictional matters.
220
  
The tribunal did not address the argument. This Chapter aims to determine what 
could have been the outcome had the tribunal decided to focus on the matter. In the 
first Section, it presents the factual background of the case and its evaluation (5.1). In 
the second Section it examines the understanding of the clause as demonstrated by 
other investment arbitration tribunals (5.2). The last Section focuses on the MFN 
clauses contained in Czech Republic’s BITs (5.3). 
5.1. FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND EVALUATION OF TRIBUNAL’S 
FINDINGS 
In the case of Frontier Petroleum, Frontier Petroleum Services Ltd. was a Canadian 
company that made an investment in a Czech aircraft manufacture company. The 
Czech Republic allegedly interfered with this investment and a dispute arose. It was 
later presented to an investment arbitration tribunal. The respondent denied tribunal’s 
jurisdiction asserting the tribunal lacks jurisdiction ratione materiae.
221
  
The claimant addressed all of respondent’s grounds for this assertion and in order to 
best secure its access to arbitration, it submitted an alternative argument. The 
claimant alleged that should the tribunal conclude that it lacked jurisdiction due to a 
narrow construction of the applicable provisions in the Canada BIT, the claimant is 
entitled to benefit from a more broadly constructed clause found in the USA BIT by 
the virtue of an MFN clause present in the Canada BIT.
222
 The claimant thus asked 
the tribunal to apply a generally worded MFN clause to extend the scope of 
tribunal’s jurisdiction beyond the wording of the original dispute resolution clause. 
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The submission was not addressed as the tribunal found it had jurisdiction as 
respondent’s arguments did not stand.
223
 
The consequences of a possible affirmative answer from the side of the tribunal 
would be far reaching. If such arguments are found to be valid, any safeguards that a 
state has inserted in its BITs with respect to jurisdiction may become obsolete. If the 
MFN clause is understood to encompass jurisdictional issues, then one broadly 
drafted dispute resolution clause present in any of the host state’s BITs will open the 
door to arbitration for any investor from a state that has also concluded a BIT with 
the host state, if this BIT contains a MFN clause. Investors that so far have been 
deterred from raising a claim by narrowly constructed dispute resolution clauses will 
be free to raise claims against states, and the number of arbitrations will increase. 
Of course it can be objected that as sovereign states the contracting parties were free 
to insert a clause to that effect in their BITs and as such the consequences thereof are 
perfectly legitimate. However, the position the Czech Republic expressed in Frontier 




Unfortunately, the tribunal in Frontier Petroleum did not state its opinion in regard 
to this matter. The issue has been however presented to other tribunals. Their 
findings indicate how MFN clauses may be interpreted in the future.  
5.2. UNDERSTANDING OF MFN CLAUSES BY TRIBUNALS 
Some claimants have already attempted, under various circumstances, to gain an 
advantage through a MFN clause.
225
 Troublingly, when faced with the question 
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whether MFN clauses extend to jurisdictional matters, tribunals have expressed very 
different opinions.  
Some tribunals
226
 held that MFN clauses apply to dispute resolution. Despite having 
far-reaching ramifications, there are arguments which justify this position. The 
tribunal in Emilio Agustín Maffezini v the Kingdom of Spain
227
 gave the following 
explanation: 
‘Consular jurisdiction in the past, like other forms of extraterritorial 
jurisdiction, were considered essential for the protection of rights of 
traders and, hence, were regarded not merely as procedural devices but 
as arrangements designed to better protect the rights of such persons 
abroad. It follows that such arrangements, even if not strictly a part of 
the material aspect of the trade and investment policy pursued by 
treaties of commerce and navigation, were essential for the adequate 





 came to the same conclusion, but subjected the application of MFN 
clauses to jurisdictional matters to restrictions – according to these tribunals, the 
MFN clause can only extend existing rights; it cannot created rights where none 
previously exited.
 230
 The MFN clause can ease the conditions for access to 
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international arbitration if a dispute resolution clause is strict, but in the absence of a 
dispute resolution clause it cannot create the basis for tribunals’ jurisdiction. 
Other tribunals
231 
held that dispute resolution clauses are in general covered by MFN 
clauses, but the specific MFN clauses which they were faced with did not. Yet 
another group of tribunals
232
 found that MFN clauses are inapplicable to dispute 
resolution, except for where expressly stated otherwise. The tribunal in Telenor 
Mobile Communications AS v the Republic of Hungary
233
 offers the following 
reasoning: 
‘In the absence of language or context to suggest the contrary, the 
ordinary meaning of “investments shall be accorded treatment no less 
favourable than that accorded to investments made by investors of any 
third State” is that the investor's substantive rights in respect of the 
investments are to be treated no less favourably than under a BIT 
between the host State and a third State, and there is no warrant for 
construing the above phrase as importing procedural fights as well. It 
is one thing to stipulate that the investor is to have the benefit of MFN 
investment treatment but quite another to use an MFN clause in a BIT 
to bypass a limitation in the very same BIT when the parties have not 
chosen language in the MFN clause showing an intention to do this, as 
has been done in some BITs.’
234
 
The different positions taken by tribunals cannot be satisfactorily explained by 
differences in wordings of the clauses. Several tribunals interpreted the same BITs 
and reached different conclusions. The BIT between Germany and Argentina
235
 was 
subjected to interpretation by the tribunal in Wintershall v Argentina, which 
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restricted the MFN clause,
236
 and also by tribunals in Siemens v Argentina and 
Hochtief v Argentina, which expanded the MFN clause to dispute resolution.
237
 The 
tribunal in ICS Inspection v Argentina
238
 examined the BIT between Argentina and 
the United Kingdom
239
 and interpreted the clause restrictively, whereas the tribunal 
in National Grid Plc v Argentina
240
 interpreted the same clause extensively.  
Moreover, the same phrases included in different MFN clauses have been found to 
carry different meanings. Several tribunals
241
 were presented with MFN clauses that 
related to ‘all matters’ governed by a treaty. The phrase was both pronounced to 
signify that the contracting parties wished to include dispute resolution to the 
matter,
242
 and on the other hand not to cover dispute settlement.
243
 Similarly, the 
term ‘treatment’ has been found to encompass dispute resolution
244




Finally, tribunals vary in their opinion on what silence on the topic signifies; some 
ruled MFN clauses are applicable to dispute settlement unless the parties clearly state 
otherwise,
246




In the light of the above it does not seem to be the specific wording of a BIT that 
determines the verdict. Rather than that, as Dolzer and Schreuer
248
 observe, the 
division of the cases into two opposing groups correspondents to their factual 
situation. Tribunals allowed the application of MFN clauses to dispute resolution in 
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cases where claimants attempted to use the MFN clause to circumvent minor 
procedural obstacles,
 249
 such as a requirement to resort to the host state domestic 
courts for a period of time prior the institution of arbitration. On the other hand, in 
cases where the claimant attempted to gain a more substantial advantage, such as to 
extend the scope of the tribunal’s jurisdiction to cases that would otherwise be 
completely outside the scope of tribunal’s jurisdiction, the tribunals did not endorse 
this attempt.
250
 However, there are exceptions on both sides.
251
 
The differences in the outcomes are understandable. In cases where arbitration has 
already commenced it would seem unnecessary to decline jurisdiction over a minor 
procedural matter.
252
 On the other hand, the situation is different when a claimant 
attempts ‘to bypass a limitation in the settlement resolution clause of the [BIT].’
253
 
Effectively, such attempts ‘subvert the common intention of [the contracting States] 
in entering into the BIT in question’
254
 and should not be allowed. 
The above described leads to one principle observation: there is a huge amount of 
perplexity when it comes to MFN clauses. The positions tribunals have taken 
towards MFN clauses are widely different. The lack of stable approach to MFN 
clauses creates confusion. It seems that the states may only be certain (if such thing 
as certainty exists in investment arbitration) that the tribunals will not extend MFN 
clauses to jurisdiction if the MFN clause itself expressly states so.  
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5.3. MFN CLAUSE IN CZECH REPUBLIC’S BITS 
It now remains to be assessed whether in future, investors may be tempted to use 
MFN clauses as a gate to arbitration against the Czech Republic, or whether the 
Czech BITs are able to prevent this behaviour. 
Most of the BITs the Czech Republic has concluded
255
 contain either the following 
MFN clause, or one of a very similar wording (‘Standard MFN clause’):  
‘1. Each Contracting Party shall in its territory accord to investments 
and returns of investors of the other Contracting Party treatment which 
is not less favourable than that which it accords to investments and 
returns of its own investors or to investments and returns of investors 
of any third State, whichever is more favourable. 
2. Each Contracting Party shall in its territory accord to investors of the 
other Contracting Party, as regards management, maintenance, use, 
enjoyment or disposal of their investment, treatment which is fair and 
equitable and not less favourable than that which it accords to its own 
investors or of any third State, whichever is more favourable.’ 
MFN clauses of this content have already been examined by arbitral tribunals. 
Tribunals in Berschader v Russia,
256
 ICS Inspection v Argentina
257
 and Wintershall v 
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 found that this formulation excluded the application of the MFN clause 
to dispute resolution. Tribunals in Hochtief v Argentina,
259
 National Grid Plc v 
Argentina,
260
 Siemens v Argentina
261
 and RosInvest v Russia in stated the opposite. 
Troublingly, whereas in the first three of the latter group of cases the tribunals used 
MFN clauses to bypass procedural obstacles, in RosInvest v Russia the tribunal used 
the clause to create jurisdiction which it otherwise would not have. This shows that 
the MFN clauses in the majority of Czech Republic’s BITs could potentially be used 
by investors to obtain more favourable conditions regarding dispute settlement. 
Other BITs contain MFN clauses that are even more likely to be extended to dispute 
resolution clauses. Some
262
 are more general, such as the BIT between Austria and 
the Czech Republic, the Dohoda mezi Českou a Slovenskou Federativní republikou a 
Rakouskou republikou o podpoře a ochraně investic
263
 (‘Austria BIT’), which simply 
promises investors treatment no less favourable than that accorded to investors of a 




The Austria BIT has been examined by a tribunal, albeit not in a case against the 
Czech Republic, but in a case against Slovakia.
 265
 In Austrian Airlines v the Slovak 
Republic
 266
 the claimant raised an expropriation claim
267
 and argued that should the 
tribunal not base its jurisdiction on the Austria BIT, it is entitled to rule based on 
other unspecified BITs concluded by the Slovak Republic by the virtue of an MFN 
clause.
268
 The case thus falls into the category of cases where the claimants try to 
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extend the scope of jurisdiction to a case which could otherwise not be decided by 
the tribunal at all. 
The tribunal firstly found that the dispute settlement mechanism contained in Art. 8 
and Art. 4
269
 of the Austria BIT did not grant it jurisdiction over expropriation 
claims.
270
 It then turned to the MFN clause. Importantly, the tribunal found that in 
general, MFN clauses apply to dispute resolution.
271
 It however added that in this 
case, the BIT when read as a whole showed the MFN clause had to be interpreted 
restrictively.
272
 This decision brings further uncertainty to the matter, as it 
demonstrates that even though the wording of the MFN clause itself points to one 
interpretation, the tribunals may opt for another because of the way they read the BIT 
as a whole. 
Jurisdictional questions are expressly excluded from the scope of MFN clause only 
in the Agreement between the Czech Republic and the Republic of Azerbaijan for the 
Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investments (‘Azerbaijan BIT’).
273
 Art. 3(6) 
of the Azerbaijan BIT contains the following provision: 
‘For the avoidance of doubt, the present Article shall apply only in 
respect of the kinds of treatment offered in Articles 2 to 7 of this 
Agreement, and shall not apply in respect of Investor's rights to submit 




This caveat, when read pursuant to Art. 31 VCLT, should stop investors from 
successfully attempting to gain a standing in front of a tribunal solely by the virtue of 
the MFN clause. 
It appears that the Czech Republic intended that all its MFN clauses should be 
interpreted this way. Firstly, Art. 3(6) of the Azerbaijan BIT clarifies Art. 3(1) and 
3(2) that contain the Standard MFN Clause. This indicates that all the Standard MFN 
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Clauses were meant to be understood this way; otherwise, it would be more prudent 
to draft an entirely different MFN clause rather than using the Standard MFN Clause 
and giving it a new meaning.
275
  
Secondly, the BIT was signed in 2011, after the most prominent arbitral awards on 
the topic of MFN clause have been issued. It therefore seems that in the light of the 
subsequent development in the understanding of the MFN clauses, the Czech 
Republic wished to clarify the MFN clauses in its BITs. Thirdly, in Frontier 




The case of Frontier Petroleum brought the problem of understanding of MFN 
clauses into spotlight. The position of the Czech Republic is that MFN clauses were 
not meant to be the basis for tribunals’ jurisdiction. However, arbitral practice shows 
that tribunals have demonstrated very varied understandings of the subject, with 
some endorsing the position of the Czech Republic and some demonstrating an 
understanding to the contrary. 
In the view of the confusion and conflicting decisions regarding MFN clauses, it 
appears that the only way the Czech Republic can ensure that the MFN clauses will 
not be used to circumvent jurisdictional obstacles is to include an additional 
explanatory provisions, such as Art. 3(6) of the Azerbaijan BIT, to the existing MFN 
clauses.  
6. CONCLUSION  
This work aimed to answer the question whether the high number of investment 
cases commenced against the Czech Republic could have been partially prompted by 
ineffective BIT provisions, and if so, whether other BITs would be more effective 
and how to make them so. The conducted analysis showed that in the three issues 
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that were examined, investors believed it could successfully raise a claim because the 
respective provisions in the BITs would not stop it; and they were mostly right. The 
vast majority of Czech BITs would not be effective in the analysed situations either. 
There are however ways how to improve them. 
The first issue examined in this work was treaty shopping. There are two main types 
of treaty shopping: treaty shopping at the back end of an investment, conducted with 
the sole purpose of gaining access to international investment arbitration to solve a 
concrete dispute, and treaty shopping at the front end of an investment, which an 
investor undertakes as a part of effort to protect its investment in the best possible 
way against any scenario. Treaty shopping at the back end of an investment is 
universally seen as an abuse of process and likely will not be endorsed by any 
tribunal regardless of the applicable BIT.  
Treaty shopping at the front end of an investment is seen by prominent academics as 
a legitimate thing. Conversely, the Czech Republic expressed a position that it should 
not be allowed. Most of its BITs are however unable to stop it, as they contain wide 
definitions of who is an investor able to raise a claim and what constitutes investment 
over which there can be a dispute. One of the solutions to this problem could be to 
adjust these definitions in the BITs. However, for several reasons described in 
Section 3.3 this is not the best option. A more appropriate response to the issue of 
treaty shopping could be the inclusion of so called denial of benefits clauses into the 
BITs. Denial of benefits clauses allow the state to deny the benefits of the respective 
treaty to specific investors under positively determined circumstances, where an 
alleged investor is owned or controlled by persons incorporated in or with a 
nationality of a third state. These clauses are already present in three of Czech 
Republic’s BITs. With slight adjustments regarding the specification of terms 
contained therein they can be effective against both forms of treaty shopping, while 
allowing the state to decide whether or not to exercise them. 
The second issue which was analysed was the one of parallel proceedings, where one 
investor decided to multiply its chances for recovering damages by commencing two 
proceedings where he complained of the same set of measures. One of the 
proceedings was conducted in his own name, the other in a name of a company he 
owned. Similar attempts should not be endorsed for several reasons: firstly, they 
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create legal uncertainty, as each of the proceedings can (and in the cases at hand did) 
end with different verdicts. They thus undermine the faith in the whole system of 
international arbitration system, as they show how differently certain problems can 
be understood by different tribunals. Secondly, they represent an abuse of the 
protection that has been offered to investors by the Czech Republic. Thirdly, they 
bring about substantial and unnecessary expenses. 
The Czech Republic objected to tribunals’ jurisdictions using the lis alibi pendens 
principle and a fork-in-the-road clause contained in one the BITs. Tribunal’s scrutiny 
revealed that the fork-in-the-road clause could not have prevented the investor from 
raising a second claim. This clause, together with all other fork-in-the-road clauses 
that are present in certain Czech BITs, serves only to stop an identical claimant from 
raising a dispute regarding an identical BIT. These conditions were not present in 
CME and Lauder.  
A handful of Czech BITs offers alternatives to the fork-in-the-road clause that would 
have been able to preclude Mr Lauder from raising the second claim. One of such 
alternatives is a waiver clause, which requires the investor, and all entities the 
investor controls, to waive the right to commence proceedings in respect to the same 
set of measures taken by the state. The waiver clauses target a larger variety of 
situation than just CME and Lauder, but they would most probably be effective in 
these cases too, as they would compel the tribunal to either decline its jurisdiction or 
stay the proceedings. Additionally, an unusual mechanism that seems to be designed 
specifically to target investors the likes of Mr Lauder can be found in the Canada 
BIT.  
In order to secure that the investors will not be inspired by Mr Lauder’s actions and 
commence multiple proceedings, the Czech Republic should include either the 
waiver clause or a clause similar to the specific clause in the Canada BIT into its 
BITs. As the waiver clause is a solution to more types of problems, it seems efficient 
to opt for this instrument. 
The third problem that has emerged in the case law against the Czech Republic was 
the understanding of the MFN clause. More specifically, the tribunal was asked to 
extend the clause to jurisdictional issues. The Czech Republic protested against such 
move. It is hardly surprising; if MFN clause is universally understood so as to enable 
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tribunals to base their jurisdiction on any other BIT concluded by the state, any 
specific clauses that would restrict jurisdiction is certain cases, such as the clauses 
described in the preceding paragraphs, will become easy to circumvent. 
The tribunal did not address the argument. An inquiry into the practice of other 
tribunals reveals that the public opinion on the matter is troublingly divided. 
Different tribunals give different answers to this question and awards show that the 
differences cannot be attributed to different wordings of BITs. It therefore seems that 
in absence of a specific provision to the contrary, the tribunal in Frontier Petroleum 
could have found enough support in investment arbitration case law to agree with the 
claimant. 
A provision that safeguards that tribunals will not read MFN clauses as applicable to 
jurisdiction is contained in the Azerbaijan BIT. It states that the MFN clause does not 
apply in respect to investors’ rights to submit disputes to dispute settlement 
procedure. It would be prudent to include a similar clause to other BITs as well. 
In conclusion, the Czech Republic BITs contain certain provisions that in the light of 
subsequent case law revealed loopholes. These may prompt the investor to think that 
its claim, otherwise uncertain, could be successful. The Czech Republic consequently 
has to face a greater number of proceedings than it would if the provisions in the 
Czech Republic BITs
277
 were worded more specifically, or if the BITs contained 
special clauses to combat certain behaviour.  
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ABSTRACT IN ENGLISH 
Jurisdiction and Admissibility in the Czech Republic’s BITs 
The purpose of this work is to assess whether the high number of investment cases 
the Czech Republic had to face was partially prompted by wordings of Czech 
Republic’s BITs. The work focuses on clauses that pertain to jurisdiction of tribunal 
and admissibility of claim, as these are the first questions that are raised in every 
proceedings. 
The work consists of six Chapters. The first Chapter is introductory and outlines the 
issues that will be examined. The second Chapter defines the terms ‘jurisdiction’ and 
‘admissibility’ and explains how the concepts relate to provisions of BITs. 
The third Chapter is dedicated to topic of treaty shopping. It explores cases against 
the Czech Republic where the issue of treaty shopping was raised, analyses the 
argumentation and provisions that were used in each case together with similar 
provisions contained in other Czech BITs, and suggests changes that should be made 
in order to make the clauses more effective against treaty shopping. 
The fourth Chapter examines the instance of parallel proceedings commenced 
against the Czech Republic. In a structure similar to the previous Chapter, it firstly 
analyses the awards and the BITs that were used together with the rest of the Czech 
BITs. Finally it inquires whether the provisions should be altered in order to be able 
to combat the practice. 
The fifth Chapter focuses on MFN clauses and asks whether their effect can be 
extended to dispute resolution clauses. Given that the tribunal who was presented 
with the question did not address it, the work turns to the findings of other 
investment tribunals. It then assesses how to prevent the use of MFN clauses on 
dispute resolution clauses. 
The sixth Chapter concludes the work. It states that the high number of cases could 
indeed have been partially caused by BIT provisions, as investors saw the 
opportunity to take advantage of either too broadly or too strictly worded clauses and 
took it. Similar provisions are present in a large number of Czech BITs; unless they 
are rephrased, investors can raise controversial cases again.  
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ABSTRAKT V ČESKÉM JAZYCE 
Pravomoc tribunálu a přípustnost nároků ve dvoustranných dohodách na 
ochranu a podporu investic uzavřených Českou republikou 
Cílem práce je zjistit, zda vysoký počet mezinárodních investičních arbitráží, kterým 
musela v minulosti Česká republika čelit, je částečně zapříčiněn formulací českých 
BIT. Práce se zaměřuje na otázku pravomoci tribunálu případ rozhodnout a na otázku 
přípustnosti nároku, neboť tyto dvě otázky jsou v rozhodčím řízení kladeny jako 
první. 
Práce se skládá ze šesti částí. První část je úvodní. Druhá část vysvětluje pojem 
jurisdikce tribunálu a přípustnost nároku a jejich ýásouvislost s BIT. 
Třetí část práce se zabývá fenoménem označovaným anglickým názvem „treaty 
shopping“. Nejprve zkoumá případy, ve kterých byl investor z této činnosti obviněn 
a dále zkoumá argumentaci a ustanovení, která byla v případech použita. Následně 
zjišťuje, zda jsou podobné doložky obsaženy i v dalších BIT uzavřených Českou 
republikou, a zda by se jejich znění měla upravit, aby byla ustanovení proti „treaty 
shopping“ účinnější.   
Čtvrtá část práce zkoumá případy paralelních rozhodčích řízení. Ve struktuře 
obdobné jako v předchozí kapitole zjišťuje, jaké argumenty a ustanovení byly 
tribunálu předloženy, jak se s nimi tribunál vypořádal, a zda jsou podobné doložky 
k nalezení i v ostatních BIT. Dále navrhuje, jak BIT upravit, aby se v budoucnu 
problému lépe zamezilo. 
Pátá kapitola se soustředí na zacházení podle doložky nejvyšších výhod a hledá 
odpověď na otázku, zda se vztahují také na pravomoc tribunálu. Tribunál, u kterého 
byla tato otázka vznesena, se tématem nezabýval. Práce se proto obrací na 
rozhodnutí jiných tribunálů. V poslední části kapitoly se zjišťuje, jak nejlépe zamezit 
tomu, aby tribunály založily svou jurisdikci na zacházení podle doložky nejvyšších 
výhod. 
Šestá kapitola práci uzavírá shrnutím, že k vysokému počtu rozhodčích řízení proti 
České republice mohlo přispět znění českých BIT. V určitých případech investoři 
využili někdy příliš širokých a někdy naopak příliš úzce formulovaných ustanovení a 
založili na nich svůj nárok. Podobná ustanovení jsou obsažena i řadě dalších českých 




TEZE V ČESKÉM JAZYCE 
PRAVOMOC TRIBUNÁLU A PŘÍPUSTNOST NÁROKŮ VE 
DVOUSTRANNÝCH DOHODÁCH NA OCHRANU A PODPORU 
INVESTIC UZAVŘENÝCH ČESKOU REPUBLIKOU 
1. ÚVOD 
Do začátku roku 2015 musela Česká republika čelit minimálně 29 investičním 
sporům. Toto číslo je v porovnání s ostatními zeměmi mimořádně vysoké, Česká 
republika je třetím nejžalovanějším státem před mezinárodními investičními 
tribunály. 
Tento stav jistě není žádoucí a je třeba analyzovat jeho příčiny. Samotná 
problematika investičních sporů je však velmi složitá a z velké části zasahuje i do 
mimoprávních oborů. Cílem této práce je objasnit, do jaké míry přispívá k vysokému 
počtu investičních sporů způsob, jakým jsou formulována určitá ustanovení 
dvoustranných dohod na podporu a ochranu investic („BIT“) uzavřených Českou 
republikou.  
Prozkoumání rozhodčích nálezů vydaných v investičních sporech vedených proti 
České republice, ať už vyznívajících v její prospěch či v její neprospěch, odhaluje 
jeden zajímavý poznatek: podání žalob bylo v několika případech pro investory 
velmi riskantní. Rozhodčí řízení je velmi drahé a časově náročné. Dalo by se tedy 
očekávat, že jej investoři budou iniciovat pouze za situace, kdy jsou si do značné 
míry jisti svým úspěchem. Tedy, kdy jsou přesvědčeni, že skutková situace skutečně 
vede k závěru, že stát porušil své povinnosti vyplývající z BIT, a dále pak, že 
rozhodčí tribunál, ke kterému žalobu podávají, bude mít pravomoc ve sporu 
rozhodnout. Přesto se vyskytly případy, kdy investoři podali žalobu za situace, kdy 
by tribunál podle názorů převažujících v praxi i mezi akademiky neměl mít nad 
sporem jurisdikci, či nárok neměl být přípustný, nebo byla pravomoc tribunálu a 
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přípustnost nároku přinejmenším sporná. Tyto kauzy budou dále podrobněji 
zkoumány. 
Případy je možné rozřadit do tří kategorií. V první   kategorii se nacházejí kauzy, kdy 
se investoři dopustili jednání, které se označuje anglickým termínem „treaty 
shopping“. Výraz označuje situaci, kdy investor s příslušností státu, který nemá 
(v našem případě) s Českou republikou uzavřenou BIT, nebo je pro ně BIT méně 
výhodná, učiní investici prostřednictvím dceřiné společnosti s příslušností státu, 
který s Českou republikou uzavřel BIT pro investora výhodnější. Podle obecně 
uznávaného názoru je toto jednání zavrženíhodné, pokud se jej investor dopustil 
s cílem získat přístup k mezinárodnímu rozhodčímu řízení ohledně již vzniklého 
sporu. V ostatních situacích, kdy se investor jen obecně snaží zabezpečit svou 
investici proti veškerým případným rizikům, se „treaty shopping“ obecně nepovažuje 
za nepřípustné jednání. Státy ale mohou být toho názoru, že ani takováto forma 
„treaty shopping“ není žádoucí. 
„Treaty shopping“ se vyskytl ve dvou případech vedených proti České republice. 
Prvním z nich byla kauza Saluka proti České republice (“Saluka”), druhým Phoenix 
proti České republice („Phoenix“). V případu Saluka se investor dle názoru tribunálu 
nedopustil „treaty shopping“, který by byl zakázaný aplikovatelnou BIT. Na druhou 
stranu Phoenix je příkladem „treaty shopping“, kterého se investor dopustil se 
záměrem iniciovat řízení o konkrétním sporu před rozhodčím tribunálem. Tribunál se 
proto v tomto případě odmítl sporem zabývat. Česká republika však chování 
odsoudila v obou případech. 
Druhá  kategorie obsahuje případy paralelních řízení, které představují kauzy Lauder 
proti České republice („Lauder“) a CME proti České republice („CME“). Pan Lauder 
zde inicioval dvě arbitrážní řízení, jedno svým jménem a druhé jménem společnosti 
CME Czech Republic B.V., kterou vlastnil. Obě řízení se týkala stejných opatření 
přijatých Českou republikou, a principiálně i stejné škody, která z nich údajně vzešla. 
Česká republika namítala, že rozhodčí tribunály neměly pravomoc spor rozhodnout a 
že nárok byl nepřípustný, neboť se jednalo o zneužití práva iniciovat mezinárodní 
investiční arbitráž. V obou případech dle České republiky existovala překážka 
probíhajícího řízení, kvůli které nebylo možné v řízeních pokračovat. Oba tribunály 
však rozhodly, že jsou oprávněny vést řízení. 
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Do třetí kategorie případů spadá zacházení podle doložky nejvyšších výhod 
(„doložka MFN“). V případě Frontier Petroleum Services proti České republice 
(„Frontier Petroleum“) byl vznesen alternativní argument, že pokud by tribunál 
shledal, že mu stávající BIT neposkytuje nad sporem jurisdikci, má svou jurisdikci 
založit na doložce o řešení sporů obsažené v jiné BIT, neboť mu to umožňuje 
doložka nejvyšších výhod ve stávající BIT. Tribunál se tímto argumentem nezabýval. 
Pohled na nálezy ostatních tribunálů zabývajících se tímto tématem ukazuje, že 
judikatura je ohledně účinku MFN doložky rozpolcená a tribunál by našel 
dostatečnou podporu pro kladné i záporné rozhodnutí. 
Všechny případy mají společné dvě spolu související skutečnosti. Za prvé je 
z vyjádření České republiky patrné, že stát chtěl těmto situacím zabránit, a to za 
použití obranných mechanismů zakotvených v BIT. Argumenty však až na jeden 
z případů (Phoenix) tribunál nepřesvědčily a mechanismy se v daných situacích 
ukázaly být neefektivní. Za druhé se v těchto případech investoři vůbec neměli 
rozhodnout spor vznést, neboť měli být od vyvolání mezinárodní investiční arbitráže 
odrazeni zněním BIT. Tak se však nestalo a celkový počet rozhodčích řízení 
započatých proti České republice byl navýšen. 
Nabízí se zde proto tyto výzkumné otázky: „Mohl být vysoký počet investičních 
arbitráží proti České republice způsoben neefektivními ustanoveními BIT?“ Pokud 
ano, pak je relevantní otázka: „Obsahují ostatní BIT ustanovení, která by byla 
v daných situacích účinnější, tak aby se tyto situace už neopakovaly?“ Pokud ne, je 
třeba se ptát: „Existují vůbec takové mechanismy?“ 
Při hledání odpovědi na tyto otázky předložená práce nejprve analyzuje všechny výše 
uvedené případy a zaměřuje se na ustanovení BIT, která v nich byla použita. Dále 
zkoumá všechny ostatní BIT uzavřené Českou republikou, aby zjistila, zda jsou tato 
ustanovení obsažená i v dalších dohodách a pokud ano, jak jsou formulována. 
Následně jsou všechna tato ustanovení analyzována ve světle případů, kterým by 
měla být schopna zabránit, a v doložkách se navrhují změny sloužící ke zvýšení 
jejich účinnosti. 
Práce tudíž vychází především ze znění rozhodčích nálezů a českých BIT. Závěry 
v ní obsažené jsou inspirovány také akademickými pracemi pojednávajícími o 
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jednotlivých problémech, a tam, kde jsou relevantní, také nálezy ostatních tribunálů 
na stejná témata. 
Práce je členěna do šesti kapitol. První kapitola je úvodní. Druhá se zabývá pojmy 
„jurisdikce“ a „přípustnost nároku“ a vysvětluje, proč jsou tyto aspekty rozhodčího 
řízení spojené se zněním BIT. Třetí kapitola pojednává o prvním z výše uvedených 
problémů, a sice fenoménu “treaty shopping“. Otázka paralelních řízení je obsahem 
čtvrté kapitoly. Pátá kapitola se zaměřuje na vztah zacházení podle doložky 
nejvyšších výhod a jurisdikce rozhodčího tribunálu. Šestá kapitola obsahuje shrnutí a 
závěr práce. 
2. JURISDIKCE TRIBUNÁLU A PŘÍPUSTNOST NÁROKU 
Jurisdikce tribunálu a přípustnost nároku jsou velmi důležité komponenty rozhodčího 
řízení. Bez nich nemůže tribunál vydat rozhodčí nález. Otázka jejich existence by 
tedy měla být prvním, čím se bude investor zabývat, když se rozhoduje, zda podat 
žalobu. Je tudíž důležité ujasnit si, co tyto dva pojmy znamenají a jaký je jejich vztah 
k BIT. 
Pojem jurisdikce označuje pravomoc tribunálu vydat v daném případě rozhodnutí. 
Jako v každém rozhodčím řízení, vychází tato pravomoc v mezinárodní investiční 
arbitráži ze souhlasu obou stran. Zatímco souhlas investora je typicky vyjádřen 
podáním žaloby, souhlas státu může být dán několika způsoby. Tím nejčastějším 
z nich je souhlas obsažený v doložce o řešení sporů, která je součástí BIT. Stát v ní 
vyjadřuje souhlas s tím, aby byl případný spor s investory s příslušností státu, který 
je druhou smluvní stranou BIT, řešen mezinárodním investičním tribunálem. Otázku, 
zda má tribunál jurisdikci, lze tedy přeformulovat na otázku: „Udělil stát v doložce o 
řešení sporů souhlas s tím, aby se spor o dané otázce s daným žalobcem řešil před 
mezinárodním investičním tribunálem?“  
Přípustnost nároku je odlišný koncept. Při zkoumání přípustnosti nároku se tribunál, 
který předtím určil, že má pravomoc spor rozhodnout, ptá, zda je přípustné či vhodné, 
aby se sporem zabýval. Není to již otázka svolení k arbitráži, ale otázka okolností 
doprovázejících spor. Důvody, pro které může být návrh nepřípustný, jsou velmi 
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různorodé. Tribunály shledaly nepřípustnost například z důvodu, že žalobce nebyl 
v dobré víře, nebo proto, že měl být k projednání sporu v prvé řadě příslušný jiný 
tribunál. Právní základ pro závěr, že je návrh nepřípustný, se typicky nenachází v 
samotné BIT. To však neznamená, že by tomu tak nemohlo být, a že by si státy 
nemohly sjednat doložky určující, za jakých situací by spor neměl být projednán. 
Chce-li stát zajistit, že tribunál nebude mít pravomoc určitý spor rozhodnout, nebo že 
bude muset prohlásit nárok za nepřípustný, musí zařadit do svých BIT ustanovení 
s tímto účinkem. Při hledání odpovědi na otázku, zda vysoký počet rozhodčích řízení 
proti České republice může být způsoben problematickou úpravou jurisdikce 
tribunálu či přípustnosti nároku, je proto vhodné zkoumat BIT. 
3. TREATY SHOPPING 
Pojem „treaty shopping“ je definován jako chování, při kterém se investor záměrně 
snaží získat výhody vyplývající z BIT tím, že realizuje svou investici nebo vznáší 
žalobní nárok prostřednictvím společnosti s příslušností třetí země, která má 
s hostitelským státem uzavřenou výhodnou BIT.  
Nauka rozlišuje takzvané „treaty shopping na začátku investice“ a „treaty shopping 
na konci investice“. První se odehrává v době, kdy investor provádí svou investici. O 
druhém se hovoří za situace, kdy se investor snaží změnit vlastnickou strukturu 
investice v momentě, kdy se v souvislosti s investicí vyskytl problém, a z toho 
důvodu, aby získal přístup k mezinárodní investiční arbitráži. Část akademiků se 
shoduje na tom, že první z popsaných druhů „treaty shopping“ není nepřípustný a 
neměl by být ani zakázaný. Česká republika však ve sporu Saluka vyjádřila názor, že 
toto chování není žádoucí. Druhá z forem „treaty shopping“ je obecně odsuzována. 
Česká republika se s ním setkala v kauze Phoenix. 
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3.1. SKUTKOVÉ PODSTATY PŘÍPADŮ SALUKA A PHOENIX A 
ZHODNOCENÍ POSTOJE TRIBUNÁLU 
V případu Phoenix se jednalo o investora české národnosti, který v Izraeli založil 
společnost Phoenix. Na tuto společnost byla následně převedena investice vlastněná 
rodinným příslušníkem českého investora, a to v době, kdy se o tuto investici 
v České republice začala zajímat policie. Společnost Phoenix následně podala žalobu 
k mezinárodnímu investičnímu tribunálu. Česká republika namítala, že případ je 
zneužitím mezinárodní ochrany investic. Tribunál žalovanému přisvědčil, rozhodl, že 
nárok je nepřípustný a žalobu zamítl. 
Případ Saluka pojednával o nizozemské společnosti Saluka, která byla vlastněna 
japonským koncernem. Saluka podala proti České republice žalobu. Stát se bránil, že 
Saluka neučinila v České republice žádnou investici ve smyslu BIT, a že skutečným 
investorem není Saluka, ale japonský koncern. Tribunál však po prostudování znění 
BIT dospěl k závěru, že Saluka splňuje její definici investora, a že učinila investici 
v právním slova smyslu. 
3.2. PRÁVNÍ DŮVODY ZÁVĚRŮ OBSAŽENÝCH V ROZHODČÍCH 
NÁLEZECH  
K zodpovězení otázky, zda je něco v nepořádku s českými BIT, je nutné zjistit, jaká 
ustanovení BIT byla v jednotlivých případech použita, jaký cíl tím byl sledován, a 
jak tribunály argumenty přijaly. 
V případě Phoenix se argumentovalo především obecnou právní zásadou, že ochrana 
se poskytuje pouze těm právům, která jsou vykonávána v dobré víře. Tribunál 
v tomto případě situaci pečlivě zkoumal a z několika různých důvodů došel k závěru, 
že se v tomto případě jednalo o zneužití práva a investor tedy v dobré víře nejednal. 
Na tomto místě je nutno podotknout, že případ Phoenix byl ukázkovým příkladem 
“treaty shopping“ na konci investice, tedy praxe, která je obecně zavrhovaná. 
Tribunál prohlásil nárok za nepřípustný jen na základě obecných zásad právních, 
pozitivní znění právní úpravy v tomto případě nehrálo roli. Dá se tedy očekávat, že 
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na to, aby se stát ubránil případům jako je Phoenix, není třeba žádné speciální 
ustanovení. 
Jinak je tomu v případě Saluka. Česká republika zde argumentovala, nad rámec 
definice investice a investora obsažené v předmětné BIT musí tribunál zkoumat, zda 
investor skutečně zamýšlel provádět ekonomické operace na území hostitelského 
státu, a zda byl investor pouhým prostředníkem, skrze kterého by operovala jiná 
entita. Tribunál k tomu uvedl, že ačkoliv má pro tyto požadavky pochopení, ve znění 
BIT oporu nemají. Definice investice a investora byla velmi široká s minimálními 
požadavky a tribunálu nepříslušelo tuto definici rozšiřovat. Saluka proto mohla 
vznést svůj nárok.  
3.3. DEFINICE INVESTICE A INVESTORA V ČESKÝCH BIT 
Případ Saluka ukazuje, že co se týče znění BIT, spočívají faktory umožňující „treaty 
shopping“ především v definicích investice a investora. Průzkum ostatních BIT 
uzavřených Českou republikou odhaluje, že většina z nich obsahuje definici stejně 
obsáhlou, ne-li širší, než definice zkoumaná v případu Saluka. Většina českých BIT 
by tedy „treaty shopping“ nezabránila.  
Nabízí se proto otázka, zda je nejlepší obranou proti tomuto chování změna těchto 
definic. Práce dochází  k tomu, že není. Důvody pro tento závěr by se daly shrnout 
jako poznání, že ačkoliv se Česká republika v případu Saluka bránila jurisdikci 
tribunálu, což je vzhledem k tomu, že se snažila vyhnout investičnímu sporu, 
pochopitelné, „treaty shopping“ na začátku investice není bez dalšího chováním 
zavrženíhodným. Státy jej samy podněcují, když soutěží v tom, který nabídne 
investorovi lepší podmínky. Většina investorů, kteří využívají možností co nejlépe 
zabezpečit svou investici proti případným zásahům, by proto měla mít přístup 
k mezinárodní ochraně. Definice investice a investora by toto měla reflektovat a měla 
by být dostatečně obsáhlá, aby zahrnula všechny myslitelné investory.  
Jako vhodnější řešení se proto jeví identifikovat ta jednání, která by skutečně měla 
být zakázána. Tvoří totiž mnohem menší skupinu než různorodí investoři, kteří 
zamýšlí investovat v České republice. Jako taková může být definice konkrétních 
jednání, která jsou zakázaná, mnohem přesnější a cílenější, než formulace dopadající 
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na veškerá jednání, která jsou dovolená. Navrhuje se tedy ponechat stávající definice 
investice a investora a zařadit do BIT nové doložky, které by specifikovaly, kdo a za 
jakých podmínek je z mezinárodní ochrany vyňat. 
3.4. DOLOŽKY, KTERÉ UMOŽŇUJÍ STÁTU ODEPŘÍT INVESTOROVI 
OCHRANU NABÍZENOU MU BIT 
Příkladem takové doložky je takzvaná „denial of benefits“ doložka, tedy doložka, 
která umožňuje státu prohlásit, že při splnění určitých podmínek se na investora 
ochrana nabízená BIT nevztahuje. Tyto podmínky typicky zahrnují skutečnost, že 
investor je vlastněn nebo ovládán jiným investorem s příslušností třetího státu, nebo 
že investor nevykonává na území hostitelského státu podstatné obchodní aktivity.  
Tyto doložky skutečně mohou být odpovědí na problémy “treaty shopping“. Přesně 
vystihují námitky, které Česká republika k případu Saluka měla. Navíc představují 
právo státu, jehož výkon záleží na úvaze státu, nikoliv povinnost tribunálu určitým 
způsobem rozhodnout. Chce-li investor, který by byl pro stát významný a stát by o 
jeho získání usiloval, v zemi investovat a být si jistý, že bude mít přístup 
k mezinárodní ochraně, může se státem uzavřít dohodu, že stát práva poskytnutého 
mu doložkou nevyužije. 
3.5. DOLOŽKA DENIAL OF BENEFITS V ČESKÝCH BIT 
Zbývá otázka, zda české BIT podobnou doložku obsahují a pokud ano, v jakém znění? 
Odpověď není pro stát velmi příznivá. Podobná doložka je totiž obsažena jen 
v několika málo BIT.  
Ustanovení navíc obsahují několik problematických částí. První z nich je pojem 
„podstatné obchodní aktivity“. Praxe jiných tribunálů ukázala, že toto spojení může 
být vykládáno velmi restriktivně, což je způsobeno mnohoznačností pojmu v jeho 
anglické jazykové verzi. Bylo by tedy vhodné pojem upřesnit. Dalším problémem je 
skutečnost, že se po státu může požadovat, aby uplatnění této doložky investorovi 
hlásil předem, než vznikne spor. To by samozřejmě pro stát znamenalo značnou 
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zátěž, neboť by musel aktivně monitorovat všechny investory, kteří by v budoucnu 
hypoteticky mohli podat na Českou republiku žalobu. Aby doložky fungovaly tak, 
jak mají, a v momentě, kdy je toho potřeba, je nutno výslovně určit, že předchozí 
notifikace není nutná.  
Třetí kapitola této práce vede k závěru, že většina českých BIT je proti „treaty 
shopping“ na začátku investice bezbranná. Chce-li Česká republika tomuto chování 
zabránit, musí do BIT zahrnout doložky „denial of benefits“ s upraveným zněním. 
4. PARALELNÍ ŘÍZENÍ 
Další ze situací, kterou se práce zabývá, je problém vyvolaný v případech CME a 
Lauder. Jeden investor zde vyvolal dvě rozhodčí řízení proti České republice, jedno 
vlastním jménem a druhé skrze společnost, kterou ovládal. Předmětem obou řízení 
byly stejné události. Ačkoliv se Česká republika bránila, že by tribunály neměly mít 
nad paralelními řízeními jurisdikci, a alternativně že by nároky neměly být přípustné, 
oba tribunály vydaly meritorní rozhodnutí, a to dokonce s rozdílnými výsledky. 
4.1. SKUTKOVÉ PODSTATY PŘÍPADŮ CME A LAUDER A 
ZHODNOCENÍ POSTOJE TRIBUNÁLU 
V případech se jednalo o to, že jeden investor, americký občan pan Lauder, 
ovládající společnost CME inkorporovanou v Nizozemí, inicioval dvě různé 
mezinárodní arbitráže proti České republice. Žalovaný namítal nedostatek pravomoci 
tribunálu a nepřípustnost návrhu. 
Oba tribunály shledaly, že takové závěry nemají oporu v aplikovatelném právu. 
Ačkoliv se případy CME a Lauder podobají situaci, jejíž projednání by bránila 
překážka litispendence, nejsou s touto situací totožné. V obou případech se totiž 
jednalo o jiného žalobce a jiný spor.  
I přes závěry tribunálu se nelze nad postojem České republiky podivovat. Případy 
jako CME a Lauder jsou nežádoucí z několika důvodů. Z pohledu mezinárodních 
investičních arbitráží jako systému jsou problematické, neboť v nich hrozí nebezpečí 
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vydání konfliktních nálezů. Dále je možné paralelní řízení chápat jako zneužití 
systému. Uzavřením BIT státy svolily poskytnout investorovi možnost předložit spor 
o opatřeních negativně ovlivňujících investici k nestrannému a mezinárodnímu fóru. 
Jejich cílem nebylo vytvořit systém, ve kterém bude mít investor tolik příležitostí 
vyvolat mezinárodní arbitráž, kolik jich uzná za vhodné. Za třetí paralelní řízení 
představují pro stát značné nadbytečné výdaje.  
Je tedy třeba najít způsoby, jak odradit investory od toho, aby se nechali inspirovat 
panem Lauderem. 
4.2.  PRÁVNÍ DŮVODY ZÁVĚRŮ OBSAŽENÝCH V ROZHODČÍCH 
NÁLEZECH 
Protože byly oba případy rozhodovány na základě rozdílných BIT, byly rozdílné i 
prostředky, které mohla Česká republika na svou obranu využít.  
V případu CME musela Česká republika z důvodu absence vhodných ustanovení 
v BIT argumentovat obecnou právní zásadou ochrany jen takových práv, která jsou 
vykonávána v dobré víře. Tribunál ale tomuto argumentu nepřisvědčil. Jednak 
konstatoval, že České republice byla opětovně nabízena možnost řízení konsolidovat 
a tak problém paralelních řízení odstranit, což Česká republika odmítla. Dále uvedl, 
že nemůže mít investorovi za zlé, že se snaží využít všechny právem poskytnuté 
prostředky k ochraně své investice. Obě BIT, které byly v řízeních použity, jsou 
rovnocennými součástmi právního řádu České republiky, a dávají jednak panu 
Lauderovi a jednak CME možnost obrany.  
V případu Lauder Česká republika spoléhala na jedno z ustanovení BIT, podle 
kterého může investor podat žalobu pouze v případě, že už ten samý spor nepředložil 
k řešení jinému fóru. Tribunál rozhodl, že toto ustanovení jeho jurisdikci ani 
přípustnosti nároku nebrání, neboť v obou případech figuroval jiný žalobce a jednalo 
se o jiný spor. 
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4.3. MOŽNÁ ŘEŠENÍ PROBLÉMU 
Existuje několik mechanismů, které mají za úkol obecně zabraňovat paralelním 
řízením. V českých BIT se objevují tři. Práce je v této části postupně rozebírá. 
4.3.1 Investor na rozcestí 
Prvním z těchto mechanismů jsou ustanovení s anglickým názvem „fork-in-the-road“, 
který by se do češtiny dal přeložit jako „rozcestí“. Tato ustanovení nutí investora, 
aby si k řešení svého sporu se státem vybral jedno fórum a u vybraného fóra zůstal. 
Předmětné stanovení je obsaženo v BIT, kterou se zabýval tribunál ve věci Lauder, a 
také v několika ostatních českých BIT. Jak je vidět ze závěrů tribunálu, nepředstavují 
pro zkoumanou situaci vhodné řešení. Předpokládají totiž, že jak žalobce, tak spor 
jsou v obou situacích identické.  
Tyto předpoklady nebyly splněny. Byť pan Lauder a CME představovali provázané 
osoby, právně tvořili dvě rozdílné entity. Jednota sporu také nebyla dodržena. Pojem 
spor je třeba chápat v právním slova smyslu, tedy jako spor o výklad a dodržování 
konkrétní BIT. Předmětné BIT zde byly rozdílné, byly tedy rozdílné i spory. 
4.3.2. Ustanovení, které investora donutí vzdát se práva zahájit 
další rozhodčí řízení 
Dalším ustanovením, jež je třeba při hledání odpovědi na otázky položené kauzami 
CME a Lauder zvážit, je ustanovení označené v angličtině jako „waiver clause“. 
Takové ustanovení je obsaženo ve dvou českých BIT. Předepisuje, že investor může 
podat žalobu k mezinárodnímu tribunálu pouze tehdy, pokud se on a zároveň jiné 
právnické osoby, které vlastní či ovládá, vzdají práva na iniciování jiné arbitráže 
ohledně stejných opatření přijatých státem.  
Toto ustanovení je v předmětných situacích vhodnější než „fork-in-the-
road“ ustanovení. Řeší oba problémy, které se u „fork-in-the-road“ vyskytly. 
Rozšiřuje totiž okruh osob, které nemůžou vyvolat rozhodčí řízení. Dále se soustředí 
na předmět sporu a nikoliv na jeho právní základ. Klíčem k řešení problému 
paralelních řízení by tedy mohla být tato ustanovení.  
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4.3.3 Ustanovení článku 10 odst. 5 písm. b) česko-kanadské BIT  
Unikátní prostředek sloužící k zabránění situace jako je CME a Lauder nabízí česko-
kanadská BIT. Její ustanovení obsažené v článku 10 odst. 5 písm. b) předepisuje, že 
pokud je investice investora vlastněná nepřímo skrze jiného investora s příslušností 
třetího státu, nemůže investor zahájit či pokračovat v řízení, pokud na základě 
stejných skutkových okolností žalobu předložil i druhý investor.  
Toto ustanovení rovněž představuje vhodné řešení, neboť opět rozšiřuje počet osob, 
které nemohou předložit žalobu či pokračovat v řízení, a zároveň definuje 
nepřípustná paralelní řízení podle jejich předmětu a nikoliv podle aplikovatelného 
práva. S drobnými úpravami dále v práci rozvedenými by bylo proti situacím, jako 
byla ta vyvolaná případy CME a Lauder, účinné. 
Čtvrtá kapitola práce ukazuje, že většina českých BIT není schopná zabránit 
investorům, aby se vydali ve stopách pana Laudera. Existují však dva druhy 
ustanovení, která by byla proti takovému chování účinná a jejich zahrnutí s drobnými 
změnami do českých BIT by mohlo odradit investory od zahajování paralelních 
řízení. 
5. ZACHÁZENÍ PODLE DOLOŽKY NEJVYŠŠÍCH VÝHOD 
Posledním problémem, kterým se práce zabývá, je zacházení podle doložky 
nejvyšších výhod. V případu Frontier Petroleum byla položena otázka, zda se 
zacházení podle doložky nejvyšších výhod vztahuje i na doložku o řešení sporů. 
Tribunál se otázkou nezabýval. Na základě průzkumu nálezů vydaných v obdobných 




5.1. SKUTKOVÉ PODSTATY PŘÍPADU A ZHODNOCENÍ POSTOJE 
TRIBUNÁLU 
Kanadská společnost Frontier Petroleum Services Ltd. zahájila proti České republice 
mezinárodní investiční arbitráž. Aby si pojistila, že tribunál bude mít nad sporem 
jurisdikci, vznesla mimo jiné i alternativní argument nutnosti zacházení podle 
doložky nejvyšších výhod. Pokud by tribunál shledal, že mu kanadsko-česká BIT 
nedává pravomoc případ rozhodnout, měl by podle žalobce tuto pravomoc založit na 
jedné z šířeji formulovaných doložek o řešení sporů obsažených v jiných českých 
BIT, která by se na případ aplikovala díky institutu zacházení podle doložky 
nejvyšších výhod. 
Tribunál se k argumentu nevyjádřil. Případná kladná odpověď by ale měla 
dalekosáhlé důsledky. Znamenala by, že jakékoliv brzdy zabudované v doložkách o 
řešení sporů v jednotlivých BIT by bylo možné velmi snadno obejít. Není proto divu, 
že stát se takovému výkladu zacházení podle doložky nejvyšších výhod bránil. 
Zbývá tedy zjistit, zda existuje možnost, že by tribunál tímto stylem doložku 
interpretoval. 
5.2. DALŠÍ NÁLEZY VYDANÉ NA TOTO TÉMA 
Pohled na judikaturu mezinárodních investičních tribunálů ukazuje, že otázka vlivu 
zacházení podle doložky nejvyšších výhod na pravomoc tribunálu není v praxi 
mezinárodní investiční arbitráže vyřešena. 
Některé tribunály dospěly k závěrům, že zacházení podle doložky nejvyšších výhod 
se na doložku o řešení sporů bez dalšího vztahuje, nebo že se na ně takové zacházení 
vztahuje s určitými omezeními. Jiné rozhodly, že se na ně obecně vztahuje, ale 
v daném konkrétním případě, tomu tak není. Další tribunály se vyjádřily v tom 
smyslu, že zacházení podle doložky nejvyšších výhod není na otázku pravomoci 
tribunálu aplikovatelné. 
Rozdílné závěry tribunálu nemohou být připsány rozdílným zněním jednotlivých 
doložek. Několik různých tribunálů zkoumalo stejná ustanovení a dospělo 
k opačným závěrům. Nálezy ukazují, že příčiny těchto rozporů je třeba hledat spíše 
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v odlišných skutkových situacích jednotlivých případů. Jak poznamenávají Dolzer a 
Schreuer, zacházení podle doložky nejvyšších výhod bylo typicky vztahováno na 
doložky o řešení sporů v případech, kdy tribunál v zásadě jurisdikci měl už podle 
původní BIT a žalobce potřeboval obejít určitou procedurální podmínku menšího 
významu. Tribunály tak například rozhodly, že žalobce nemusel dodržet předepsanou 
lhůtu několika měsíců, než mohl vznést žalobu. Na druhou stranu tam, kde by 
tribunál vůbec neměl nad daným sporem jurisdikci a žalobce se pokoušel pravomoc 
tribunálu založit uměle, mu takový pokus nevyšel.  
Vzniká tak situace značné právní nejistoty, která jistě není žádoucí. Je proto vhodné 
zkoumat, zda v českých BIT existují ustanovení, která by nejasnost odstranila. 
5.3. ZACHÁZENÍ PODLE DOLOŽKY NEJVYŠŠÍCH VÝHOD 
V ČESKÝCH BIT 
Většina příslušných doložek v českých BIT je formulována stejným či velmi 
obdobným způsobem. Podobné doložky byly již zkoumány ostatními tribunály, 
přičemž rozhodnutí těchto tribunálů zněla jak ve prospěch, tak v neprospěch aplikace 
zacházení podle doložky nejvyšších výhod na pravomoc tribunálu případ rozhodnout. 
Jediná BIT, která obsahuje doložku, která výslovně vylučuje svou aplikaci na 
doložky o řešení sporů, je BIT uzavřená mezi Českou republikou s Ázerbájdžánem. 
Přeje-li si Česká republika do budoucna zabránit, aby tribunály zakládaly svou 
pravomoc na jiných BIT, než na BIT primárně aplikovatelné, měla by podobnou 
doložku zařadit i do svých ostatních BIT. 
6. ZÁVĚR 
Rozbor některých rozhodčích nálezů vydaných ve sporech s Českou republikou 
ukazuje, že v několika případech investoři využili široce či naopak úzce 




Průzkum ostatních českých BIT naznačuje, že většina z nich by nebyla schopna 
účinně a s jistotou podobným pokusům v budoucnu zabránit. Investorům tak nic 
nebrání v tom, aby se inspirovali chováním žalobců ve zkoumaných případech.  
Několik BIT však obsahuje ustanovení, která jsou schopná daným situacím zamezit. 
Jejich zahrnutí s drobnými úpravami do ostatních BIT by mohlo snížit počet 
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